January 1965

NAMRATĀ

An Echo from Old China

H. D. LEWIS

God and the Upanishads: I

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The Existential Protest

BJORN MERKER

The Basic Dichotomy

BOOKS REVIEWED INCLUDE

Shakespeare: His World and His Art; Lao Tzu's *Tao Teh Ching*; *Development of Religion in South India*; *The Sermon on the Mount According to Vedanta*; *The Lonely Pilgrim* (*Gandhiji's Noakhali Pilgrimage*); *A Selection of African Prose*

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THE ARYAN PATH

VOLUME XXXVI · NO. 1

Editor:
SOPHIA WADIA

Point out the 'Way'
however dimly and lost among the host —
as does the Evening Star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

AT YOUR SERVICE

I keep six honest serving men
(They taught me all I know):
Their names are WHAT *and* WHY *and* WHEN
And HOW *and* WHERE *and* WHO.

— KIPLING

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THE ARYAN PATH

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and lost among the host — as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.

— The Voice of the Silence

VOL. XXXVI JANUARY 1965 No. 1

AN ECHO FROM OLD CHINA

THE world is verily the mind; therefore the latter should be purified with all effort. As a man's mind is, so he becomes; this is the eternal secret!

—Maitri Upanishad

When he hath abandoned every desire that ariseth from the imagination and subdued with the mind the senses and organs which impel to action in every direction, being possessed of patience, he by degrees finds rest; and, having fixed his mind at rest in the true Self, he should think of nothing else. To whatsoever object the inconstant mind goeth out he should subdue it, bring it back, and place it upon the Spirit.—*Bhagavad-Gita*

Wisdom fills not the unsteady mind of the man of ruffled serenity; he is ignorant of the true teaching.

Fear there is not for him whose mind is not burning with desires, and which, having risen above likes and dislikes, is serene. He is awakened.

—Dhammapada

ANCIENT and honourable China was wise in spiritual matters and gave to the world great sages and enlightened teachers. It is, therefore, both refreshing and stimulating to go back to the treasures of her old scriptures and drink of her Wisdom. To be able to delight in that Wisdom is already a step forward on the path of enlightenment, and such delight brings serenity to the harassed mind and contentment to the anguished heart. Thus calmed in mind and confident in heart we return to our duties and our problems better equipped to fulfil our mission as human Souls.

Wisdom is spiritual knowledge and teaches divine ethics. It deals with fundamentals. It was the venerable Confucius who enjoined *"Wu Pen"*— Attend to the Fundamentals. So much of our time is spent and our energy frittered away in matters of no consequence, in things inessential, trivial, and irrelevant, while we neglect the things that really matter, the basic things, what Confucius calls "the Fundamentals."

In the treasure-house of old China there is a small Taoist scripture not sufficiently known to our contemporary civilization. That little treatise of Taoism is the *Khing Kang King*, "The Classic of Purity," which contains wise and practical instruction for every aspirant to the Higher Life. The work is ascribed in the original text to the great Chinese Sage, Lao-tze, the Teacher of the Tao. The Master is the speaker. While the teachings are undoubtedly those of Lao-tze, the actual record must be of later date, and this particular work is attributed by scholars to a follower of Lao-tze, a Taoist, who lived in the third century A.D., while Lao-tze himself lived about 600 B.C. and was a contemporary of Lord Buddha.

The word *Tao* is untranslatable into the English or any modern Western language. Just as the Sanskrit word *Dharma* cannot be fully rendered by any one word, so with the Chinese *Tao*. It is the Path to enlightenment, a way of life which leads to realization, but it is also that realization itself, and THAT which is to be realized. Lao-tze, as all great and truly wise ones, teaches that realization is the fruit of virtue and of righteousness. According to the Tao the ideal man is the man of purity, of virtue, and of truth. The *Khing Kang King* stresses purity, and hence its title, "The Classic of Purity." It is reminiscent of the *Bhagavad-Gita* and shows the need of controlling the mind through the restraint of the senses, and the eradication of all sensuous and selfish desires. It analyses and classifies desires in a masterly fashion. It reveals the true nature of man and indicates the means and the way to realize the essential Self. The Real Man is spiritual, but that Spirit is clothed in several garments which we mistake for the Real. We must regain the intuitive perception that our mind and our desires, our body and our senses, are only vehicles or *upadhis* behind which lies the Real. The cleansing of the sheaths of the Spirit reveals the vision of that Spirit, and hence the path of self-realization is fundamentally the path of purity supreme.

The *Khing Kang King* teaches that path of purity, and, proceeding from universals to particulars, it begins with the Spirit, thus: "Now the Spirit of man loves Purity. . . ." Herein an affirmation: the Real in us loves Purity. Let each one ask of himself: "Do I love Purity?" If the answer is in the negative there is something radically wrong which must be put right. The normal person, however incapable as yet of living a life of purity, should respond to the sublime ideal of inner purity.

But if the Spirit in us loves Purity, why are we not aware of this basic love?

Says the *Khing Kang King*: ". . . but the mind disturbs it." The mind must be made calm. Why is it disturbed?

> The mind of man loves stillness, but his desires draw it away. If he

could always send his desires away, his mind would of itself become still. Let his mind be made clean, and his spirit will of itself assert its purity.

According to our text there are six desires, those arising from the five senses, and the desire which arises from the idea or the thought and the memory of sense experience. If the senses are controlled and the mind detached from the desires of the senses, desires can be "sent away" and the mind regain its natural condition, which is that of stillness; for "the mind of man loves stillness." When the mind is disturbed and the desires uncontrolled, three poisons arise: greed, anger, and stupidity:

> Being attracted towards external things, men begin to seek them greedily. This greedy quest leads to perplexity and annoyance; and these again result in disordered thought, which causes anxiety and trouble to both body and mind.

Taoism recognizes in man the Spirit, the mind, and the body; and the body stands for the desires of the senses. The three poisons arise in a mind enslaved by those desires. The root cause of all troubles thus lies in the mind:

> The reason why men are not able to attain the Tao, is because their minds have not been cleansed and their desires have not been sent away.

Let us make haste to cleanse our minds and to send away our impure desires. Nothing so cleanses and strengthens the mind as placing it upon the Spirit. Let us endeavour to ideate upon eternal values that we may attain to the vision of the Real. "The True and abiding Tao! They who understand it naturally obtain it. And they who come to understand the Tao abide in Purity and Stillness."

NAMRATĀ

REDEMPTIVE TEARS?

Unshamed, we prosecute low aims;
ply gainfully our several trades;
coin shibboleths for vulgar use;
disown our lot in others' pain.
Oh, did we weep betimes for common grief
might not our acts be cleansed beyond belief?

WILLIAM EWART WALKER

GOD AND THE UPANISHADS

[This is the first part of a long and interesting study by **Professor H. D. Lewis, M.A., B.Litt.**, Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion, University of London. Professor Lewis has held other Chairs in religion and philosophy, and taught both in Britain and the U.S.A. He is, besides, General Editor of the greatly respected series, the Muirhead Library of Philosophy, and the author of several important books, among them *Our Experience of God* (1961).—Ed.]

I

Of religious life in India before the first Dravidian invasions very little is known, and we have only very scanty knowledge of the early Dravidian period. There is some reason to believe that certain features of modern Hinduism owe something at least to the practices of these very early times. It appears, for example, that cattle were treated as sacred even then in the Indus valley, where there is also evidence of a very ancient snake cult. The worship of the God Śiva may well go back to this period; and the so-called "animism" of some jungle tribes of today may have something to tell us even about the religion of prehistory in India. But whatever be the outcome of this and kindred speculations, I should be disposed to maintain that, whatever religious practices may have preceded the great religions of India, the former would have been characterized, even in the most remote ages, by some impact on the rude minds of men of a Transcendent Reality, the sense of which would inform, in some degree and perhaps intermittently, the customs we might otherwise describe as "nature religion" or straightforward animism or polytheism. Confirmation of this seems to be forthcoming when we come to those stages of development at which we begin to have some reliable records.

This is the period which begins to see the birth of Vedic literature. These compositions, containing, it may be, man's first literary effort, "the first word spoken by the Aryan Man," as Max Müller put it, must be associated mainly with the vigorous culture of the Nordic invaders who drifted into India early in the second millennium before Christ. They owe less to the Dravidian civilization or any primitive life on which these earlier invasions supervened. None the less there appears to have been much blending of the new religion and culture with the old, including the absorption of elements which may well have been indigenous; there is also the absence of any obvious signs of overt conflict at the religious level. It seems thus likely that the new religion, while developing and extending the old and making it more conscious of itself, would be taking up into its own life elements which, far from being alien or suited for absorption

in purely external or formal ways, would be already in some regard modes of substantially the same experience. The blending could not be so complete or have taken the form it has if the new religion had meant something radically different from the old. The records of the new religion may thus reflect much that had been going on long before.

It must of course be admitted that the Nordics kept themselves apart when they could, and had much contempt for the peoples they conquered; but the view has also been advanced that the stirring of thought which gave us the Vedic writings was largely brought about by the intermingling of the invaders with the original inhabitants. The persistence of some features of the old religion in the new is, in any case, certain; and this it is that tempts us to conclude that the new religion in becoming articulate, without sharply dissociating itself from the old, would be giving expression to something incipient in the old religion also. May not the main difference even be that of greater self-consciousness and clearer articulation? It would seem at any rate that enough has lived on from prehistory in Indian religion to warrant the provisional assumption that there has been no radical discontinuity of an essential nature between its dim beginnings and its higher and more reflective stages. It may thus be not too bold a speculation to regard the Vedic writings as some indication of the nature of religion in India long before these writings took shape themselves.

Even if there had been sharper conflict than any of which we have record between the religion of the Nordics and that of earlier inhabitants of the land they invaded, this would not wholly discredit the suggestion that has just been made. For the very articulation of religion may bring certain forms of it into opposition with others that substantially resemble them, and many of the more incidental features of religion, those which root it in particular customs and characteristics, may well be quite adequate occasions for conflict. But, in fact, the impression one seems to have of the early religion of India is that, at the religious level, the process of merging and integration of cultures was fairly consistent and natural, a fact that may be not without some connection with the traditionally open and all-embracing tendencies of later Hinduism. The significance of the Vedic writings as clues to problems about the origin of religion may thus be more extensive in range than might be warranted by too close an association of them with one feature only of early Indian history.

In any case we must not forget the very great age of the Vedic writings themselves, especially when we allow for the fact that many of them were transmitted from one generation to the other orally long before they were committed to writing — as happened also to other religious documents of great importance at later times in India. They take us back to a very early

period in the history of civilization and have much to tell us about the first stages of transition from primitive life to the beginnings of culture. The fact that they are the earliest Aryan documents would not of itself establish their claim to be closest to the primitive, for the obvious reason that man has not left the primitive stage at the same time or in quite the same way in all parts of the world. There are still very backward peoples in being. But we are not likely to see the latter in any normal process of emergence to more cultured existence, since any progress they make today will be certain to be that brought about by the sharp impact of modern civilization upon them. Our records of the Vedic age, on the other hand, put us at a point of peculiar advantage for noting the affinity between an early culture and ruder modes of existence from which it emerged. This gives them distinctive importance for sociology in general, but what concerns us strictly now is what we can learn from them about the beginnings of religion.

Two points only will be made here. The first is that some of the earliest Vedic hymns, namely those contained in the *Rig Veda,* have a poetic beauty and numinous quality, even in transcription, which awakens in us, as they presumably stirred in their composers and original reciters, a reaction similar to the experience of God made possible for us normally by other means today. If we apply the test which I have defended elsewhere of regarding these early media of religious life from within our own religious consciousness, the reference away to a transcendent reality seems unmistakable. But if this consideration appears to depend too much on the position which it is intended to support, let us look at other features of these early Vedas.

Perhaps I may record first the general impression of these writings provided by Professor S. Radhakrishnan. He is eminently well qualified, both by his knowledge of his own religion and by his familiarity with modern thought, to give an instructive opinion, and he writes:

> The *Rig Veda* which comprises 1,017 hymns divided into ten books, represents the earliest phase in the evolution of religious consciousness where we have not so much the commandments of priests as the outpourings of poetic minds who were struck by the immensity of the universe and the inexhaustible mystery of life. The reactions of simple yet unsophisticated minds to the wonder of existence are portrayed in these joyous hymns which attribute divinity to the striking aspects of nature.[1]

This hints at more than mere animism or straightforward polytheism. The "wonder of existence" is that which has always been felt in religion. But closer investigation will carry us further. For there appear in the

[1] *The Principal Upaniṣads,* p. 30.

Vedic pantheon certain divinities which stand in a peculiar relation to the others, in that they tend to reduce other deities to limited manifestations of themselves. Brahmā, the Creator, and Varuṇa are "high Gods" of this kind, Varuṇa in particular being regarded as a moral ruler of the world rewarding virtue and punishing sins. Nor is it altogether sound to regard these "high Gods" as signs of the first beginnings of ethical monotheism. They certainly do represent an advance upon a more polytheistic stage, but they do more than that, the position being much more complicated than the gradual abandonment of polytheism for some form of monistic religion.

The clue to the true position may, I think, again be found in the words of Radhakrishnan when he speaks of the tendency,

> when worship is accorded to any of the Vedic deities . . . to make that deity the supreme one, of whom all others are forms or manifestations. He is given all the attributes of a monotheistic deity. As several deities are exalted to this first place, we get what has been called henotheism, as distinct from monotheism. There is, of course, a difference between a psychological monotheism where one God fills the entire life of the worshipper and a metaphysical monotheism. Synthesizing processes, classification of gods, simplification of the ideas of divine attributes and powers prepare for a metaphysical unity, the one principle informing all the deities.[2]

The point to note especially here is that it seems possible, at a certain stage of development, to regard more than one deity as supreme, as almost the one sole God. This may seem to us flatly contradictory and a position in which it would not be possible for any mind to find lodgment at all. But we also know enough today of some of the extraordinary ways in which our minds do work on occasion, even at our stage of intellectual development, to find it not beyond comprehension that, just as early thinkers seem to have believed in a co-existence of opposites, so it was possible for a colourful polytheistic religion to have also a distinctively monistic aspect.

The conclusion to which this points is, in my opinion, that we should not regard monotheism as a completely new departure in religion, but as the bringing into consciousness, not always in the most adequate forms, of what has been latent from the start. How far this new understanding was the achievement of particular peoples, how and when they communicated it to others, are matters outside the scope of this enquiry. It will suffice for us to note the presence, prior to any intellectual monism, of intimations of an underlying unity of religious experience in the form of some sense of one supreme reality animating various forms of worship

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[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 83.

not overtly or consistently monistic. If this could be true at the level at which we hear of Gods like Varuṇa or Brahmā, may it not also present us with the true way of regarding polytheism and animism in yet simpler and less reflective forms? I venture to think that it is along lines like these that we should tackle the problems of the history and comparative study of early religions, being careful not to be misled by too sharp an antithesis of polytheism and monism or the expectation that the monistic alternative to polytheism should always have the form of the monotheism with which we are acquainted ourselves.

Of particular interest here also is the early manifestation in the Vedic writings of the cautious religious scepticism which, as discerning writers have much stressed of late, is never very far from profound faith. I turn to Radhakrishnan again for striking examples:

> It is said of Indra: "Of whom they ask, where is He? Of him indeed they also say, he is not." In another remarkable hymn, the priests are invited to offer a song of praise to Indra, "a true one, if in truth he is, for many say, There is no Indra, who has ever seen him? To whom are we to direct this song of praise?" . . . In another hymn Prajā-pati is praised as the creator and preserver of the world and as the one god, but the refrain occurs in verse after verse "what god shall we honour by means of sacrifice?"[3]

If words of this sort appear in a religion which is largely polytheistic, the impression is deepened that polytheism always contained within itself, and was perhaps made possible, by a latent monism. The idea of a Supreme Reality which is "not this, not that," a refrain so common in subsequent religious literature, seems to go very far back and to confirm, in that way, the view that men have had from very early times some intimations of a divine existence which is present in all things but which it is risky to characterize in any particular way. The more explicit formulations of this conviction may have tended towards pantheism more than any other view, and many later developments of them may be too pantheistic for our taste. But this is understandable; if "The Beyond" is also in all things, it might easily come to be identified, in attempts to refer expressly to it, with "all things." But I also much incline to the view that, with the keener appreciation we have today of what the transcendent character of God implies, we may find reason to doubt the strictly pantheistic nature of much that used to be regarded as such, and to look behind seemingly pantheistic formulations of religion, and any ill-effect these may have had on subsequent religious developments, to the caution which points to the authentic character of an awareness of the transcendent. The marriage of the philosophy of religion today with the comparative study of religion may

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 34.

prove particularly fruitful in this and kindred regards. I shall not follow the point further now. But I hope that, if the view can be maintained that the early Vedic documents reflect much on a wide range which went on long before their actual composition in the form in which they were recorded, enough has been said to warrant the expectation that substantial confirmation may be found in this source for the view that some consciousness of the transcendent is a more pervasive feature of the practices in which religion as we know it began than used to be supposed.

H. D. Lewis

(To be concluded)

ETHICS AND POLITICS

(A Reflection in the Month of Gandhiji's Martyrdom)

"Step out from sunlight into shade, to make more room for others" (*The Voice of the Silence*).

Such is the vision and voice of Ethics; while Politics seems to believe in the reverse thereof; for almost every politician aspires to be too much in the sun. And for aught one knows, his creed could be summed up in these words: Step out from shade into the sunlight, to make more room for yourself!

Ethics began first. Politics followed much later. The moment Eve entered the Garden of Eden, thus curtailing something of the absolute independence of Adam, their mutual companionship and consideration for each other sowed the seed of Ethics. For their individual passion, thereafter, gave place to compassion — fellow-feeling — "the Law of laws."

Later on, Politics entered the field when a family grew up around Adam and Eve. For then compassion was exposed to a conflict of different interests and ambitions, just as, whereas two are a company, three are a crowd. In other words, something of the virtue and will of making "more room for others" flew out of the window. A strange phenomenon takes place when a group, small or big, is formed for the achievement of a particular objective. The innate kindness of the individual is somewhat clipped. As Rabindranath Tagore says, "Man is kind, but men are cruel." (Here is a crucial problem for the consideration of our modern psychologists!)

Ethics lays store by, and stress on, the Golden Rule. And Politics? It underscores the Rule of Gold. The former has always in view the need of the other person, while the latter is fed on personal greed. Ethics believes in individuality; Politics in individualism. That is why Ethics makes a brother of the stranger, and Politics a stranger of the brother!

Ethics is a suburb of the Kingdom of Heaven, and the Kingdom of Heaven, they say, is run on righteousness. Politics, however, is of the earth,

earthy — part and parcel of the Kingdom of the Earth, and the Kingdom of the Earth, they say, is run, at least in these days, on oil!

When a man who lives by Ethics makes a mistake, he sets himself right by practising the "therapy of confession" — to his conscience or to his Inner Immortal Ruler. But when a practitioner of Politics (of course, Politics as it is understood and practised in our present-day world) goes astray, he resorts again and again to the "therapy of concealment." As, for instance, Gandhiji was a man of Ethics to his very finger-tips, he had no hesitation in confessing his "Himalayan blunders." How different from our popular politician's statements and speeches! These conceal more than reveal their author's motive and method.

In short, as a wag once put it, " 'Ethics' rhymes with 'mystics,' while 'politics' rhymes with 'lunatics.' " Oh, for men of Ethics to practise Politics according to the sovereign rules of integrity, of equity, and of oneness of humanity! For then will Politics be cleared of the current stigma, which attaches to it; namely, that Politics propagates "the great heresy" of separateness, and will become, in Gandhiji's words:

"... a persistent and continuous effort ... to raise the quality of human beings, to train them for freedom and fellowship, for spiritual depth and social harmony."

GURDIAL MALLIK

EMERSON'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

[**Dr. S. N. L. Shrivastava,** Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, Vikram University, Ujjain, is an old and esteemed friend. He writes, with copious illustration, of the fundamental ideas of Emerson. It is suggestive that he chooses for special attention the essays on "The Over-Soul," "Compensation," and "Self-reliance." These bear a recognizable relation to the three fundamental principles that Madame Blavatsky indicated as underlying and pervading all spiritual religion and philosophy: a universal, impersonal Godhead; a universal Law; and a process of evolution rooted in the efforts of the soul.—ED.]

"O MY BROTHERS," wrote Emerson in his essay entitled "Spiritual Laws," "God exists. There is a soul at the centre of nature and over the will of every man, so that none of us can wrong the universe." This is the *standpunkt* of the entire philosophy of Emerson, which he has so luminously elucidated in the numerous essays he has written and bequeathed unto humanity. "Life," said Emerson — and he was divinely true in saying this —

> is a train of moods like a string of beads, and as we pass through them they prove to be many-coloured lenses which paint the world their own hue, and each shows only what lies in its focus ("Experience").

Say what we will, in the last analysis, every philosophy formulated by a thinker is the coloured picture of life and existence revealed to him through the "lens" he has chosen to see through and is the picture which lies in *its* focus. The philosophy which Emerson formulates is the type of philosophy which results from seeing through the "lens" through which all the great spiritual masters down the ages have seen. To those who nonsuit the reality and validity of what does not lie in the focus of the empirico-positivist lens, as some modern philosophers do, the transcendentalist philosophy of Emerson may have no meaning whatsoever, may be "nonsense" in their wonted phrase, but those who, by their philosophical thinking, are driven, like Urban,[1] to the conclusion that empirical experience itself points to its "metempirical implicates," will ever be inclined to take up that larger lens in whose focus lie the facts of the transempirical and the spiritual.

Emerson's *Weltanschauung* was essentially that of a mystic, of a man of spiritual perception, of a man whose knowledge extends beyond the bounds of sense-experience and comprehends the spiritual *fons et origo* of all sensible things.

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[1] *Vide* W. M. URBAN: *Language and Reality* (George Allen and Unwin, London).

> The world of the senses is a world of shows; it does not exist for itself but has a symbolic character; and a true prudence or law of shows recognizes the co-presence of other laws and knows that its own office is subaltern; knows that it is surface and not centre where it works ("Prudence").

We are reminded of Eddington's characterization of scientific knowledge as a knowledge of shadows and symbols, as "a schedule of pointer-readings," "a shadowgraph performance of the drama of familiar life," and so on.

The world is a world of symbols, and there are, according to Emerson, three classes of men reacting in three different ways to the world of symbols in which they live and move:

> One class live to the utility of the symbol, esteeming health and wealth a final good. Another class live above this mark to the beauty of the symbol, as the poet and artist and the naturalist and man of science. A third class live above the beauty of the symbol to the beauty of the thing signified; these are wise men. The first class have common sense; the second, taste; and the third, spiritual perception. Once in a long time, a man traverses the whole scale, and sees and enjoys the symbol solidly, then also has a clear eye for its beauty, and lastly, while he pitches his tent on this sacred volcanic isle of nature, does not offer to build houses and barns thereon — reverencing the splendour of the God which he sees bursting through every chink and cranny. ("Prudence")

Of Emerson's numerous illuminating essays, the three most worthy of note and elucidating the cardinal principles of his spiritual philosophy of life are, in the writer's opinion, "The Over-Soul," "Self-reliance," and "Compensation." In what follows an attempt will be made to give a brief account of the elevating ideas embodied in these essays.

What is the Over-Soul? The Indian reader of Emerson's essay will readily understand that what Emerson has styled the Over-Soul is not a whit different from what has been called *Ātman* or *Brahman* in the Upaniṣads. In Emerson's words, it is

> that Unity, that Over-Soul, within which every man's particular being is contained and made one with all other; that common heart of which all sincere conversation is the worship, to which all right action is submission . . . the soul of the whole; the wise silence; the universal beauty, to which every part and particle is equally related.
>
> All goes to show that the soul in man [writes Emerson again] is not an organ, but animates and exercises all the organs; is not a function, like the power of memory, of calculation, of comparison, but uses these as hands and feet; is not a faculty but a light; is not the intellect or the will, but the master of the intellect and the will; is the background of our being in which they lie — an immensity not possessed and that cannot be possessed.

We are reminded of the kindred words of the *Kenopaniṣad*: *"shrotrasya shrotram manaso mano yad vāco ha vācam sa u prāṇasya prāṇaḥ; cakshuṣaścakshuḥ,"* etc. And when Emerson tells us that "Language cannot paint it with his colours. It is too subtile. It is undefinable, unmeasurable," etc., we again seem to be listening to an echo of the Upaniṣadic words: *"yato vaco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha."*

The Over-Soul is not a mere imaginary or useless concept which serves no practical purpose. It is the magazine of infinite power within us whose breath impels all our activities and enlivens and heightens all our faculties. The more we draw from its infinite reservoir of power and wisdom, the better for us. Spiritual living, in its true and dynamic meaning, is not to recoil from the activities of life or to lapse into a state of total inertia or some kind of kinaesthesia but to be intensely active in the light of knowledge that comes from, and with the reinforcement of power that issues from, the Over-Soul. No misunderstanding of man has been greater than this that spirituality means an atrophy of our powers and faculties or a ruination of the practical affairs of our life. Sages have taught for the improvement of life, not for its destruction. Their teachings are as pertinent to this much-vaunted dynamic age of ours as to any times past or future. The so-called practical man of the world does not really understand how much his activity is misdirected and futile when he works in ignorance of and contrary to the spiritual laws of life and how his energies could have been directed to fruitful ends if only he were aware of them and acted in conformity to them.

Emerson finely sums up the central principle of spiritual life, viewed in its practical application:

> A man is the façade of a temple wherein all wisdom and all good abide. What we commonly call man, the eating, drinking, planting, counting man, does not, as we know him, represent himself, but misrepresents himself. Him we do not respect, but the soul, whose organ he is, would he let it appear through his action, would make our knees bend. When it breathes through his intellect, it is genius; when it breathes through his will, it is virtue, when it flows through his affection, it is love. And the blindness of the intellect begins when it would be something of itself. The weakness of the will begins when the individual would be something of himself. All reform aims in some one particular to let the soul have its way through us; in other words, to engage us to obey. ("The Over-Soul")

"To let the soul have its way through us" — that is the cardinal and quintessential law of spiritual living. If we fail, we must be sure that we have not allowed the soul to work through us to the degree to which it was necessary to do so. If the Source of all fulfilment has really been tapped, no fulfilment can ever be withheld from us. The Upaniṣadic sages

indulged in no idle talk when they said that the knower of *Ātman* could obtain whatever he desired — *yo yadṛchchhati tasya tat*. Emerson assures us, as all the sages have done, that "the heart which abandons itself to the Supreme Mind finds itself related to all its works, and will travel a royal road to particular knowledges and powers" ("The Over-Soul").

All complaint about the failure of spiritual laws will, on closer examination, be found to be a complaint from men who are spiritual only complacently and half-heartedly, not genuinely, deeply, and unreservedly. Men often complacently think themselves spiritual when, in fact, they are the secret admirers and emulators of the unspiritual around them whose apparent successes overpower them and bedevil their minds. The one supreme condition for the influx of divine power and knowledge in us is our *complete* or *unreserved* self-surrender to the Divine. In Emerson's words:

> The soul gives itself alone, original and pure, to the Lonely, Original and Pure, who, on that condition, gladly inhabits, leads and speaks through it ("The Over-Soul").

In the essay "Self-reliance," Emerson elucidates the idea that genuine, original, and trustworthy knowledge comes or shines forth *direct* from the Soul or the Over-Soul. Spontaneity is the nature of that first flash of infallible truth which we often describe as Intuition. "We denote this primary wisdom as Intuition, whilst all later teachings are tuitions." Emerson enjoins reliance on this primary source of knowledge. Unfortunately the majority of mankind is a timid lot. Forsaking reliance on this pristine revelation of the soul, it crutches on the traditions of the past, on current social opinions, and on a thousand other things tutored into it. The "lungs of that inspiration which giveth man wisdom" are to be found in the Soul and that is where man must pin his faith.

> We lie in the lap of immense intelligence, which makes us receivers of its truth and organs of its activity. When we discern justice, when we discern truth, we do nothing of ourselves, but allow a passage to its beams. ("Self-reliance")

The reliance on the voice of the Soul within becomes particularly relevant and indispensable when an individual is called upon to choose his divinely ordained vocation in life. It is only the voice of his own soul which can tell him what his particular vocation is. If he simply tries to imitate others, he will be lost. Hence the exhortation of Emerson:

> Insist on yourself; never imitate. Your own gift you can present every moment with the cumulative force of a whole life's cultivation; but of the adopted talent of another you have only an extemporaneous half possession.

> That which each can do best, none but his Maker can teach him. No man yet knows what it is, nor can, till that person has exhibited it. Where is the master who could have taught Shakespeare? Where is the master who could have instructed Franklin, or Washington, or Newton? Every great man is a unique. The Scipionism of Scipio is precisely that part he could not borrow. Shakespeare will never be made by the study of Shakespeare. Do that which is assigned you, and you cannot hope too much or dare too much. ("Self-reliance")

If it be true that God exists and that the universe is created and sustained by the laws of an infinite, all-wise, and all-good intelligence, it follows but as a necessary corollary that there can be nothing evil or unjust in the universe and that nothing can prevent a man from getting his due. If a man suffers or fails, it must be due to his own fault, his own transgression of the laws of God. But man is never tired of complaining that the wicked are prosperous and happy and the righteous always suffer and are miserable and that man never gets his due in this crooked world. Against all this Emerson gives us the assurance that "Persons and events may stand for a time between you and justice, but it is only a postponement."

The problem of evil has been a vertigo for the mightiest minds. The presence of evil in the world is often posed as a challenge to the all-goodness and almightiness of God. Man is ever prone to dismiss an idealistic explanation of the problem as a pure makeshift. Emerson teaches us to view the problem in a correct perspective and enunciates the law of Compensation as perceived by him in the clear light of intuition, a law which, he assures us, would be to us "a star in many dark hours and crooked passages in our journey, that would not suffer us to lose our way."

It is difficult, indeed, to epitomize in a few words the teaching of Emerson on the subject. The reader who would grasp its full significance is advised to read and reread the essay "Compensation," and ponder deeply over it. In the lines that follow I make my own humble attempt to summarize the basic ideas of Emerson as best I can. The most crucial point is regarding our approach to the problem. Many of our misgivings about the predominance of evil in the world, about the success of the wicked and the failure of the righteous, are due to our wrong notions about what constitutes "success." We found our opinions, in Emerson's words, on "the base estimate of the market of what constitutes a manly success." We are wont to estimate success entirely in terms of wealth and property, lands, houses, dress and luxury, etc. Even if men succeed in the realization of the higher ends of life and have less of the material acquisitions named above, we think they have failed and are miserable, and pity them, and theologians hasten to give the consolation that they will be compensated in after-life. This is initially a faulty approach to the problem.

The second great truth that we have to bear in mind is this: that nature in its entirety is an interrelated and correlated whole with its law of adjustments and balancing of opposites operative without exception everywhere; so that it is an error to view any phenomenon *taken in isolation,* disjoined from its inevitable correlate, and disconnected from its essential relations in the universe, as an absolute evil or an absolute good. Polarization into opposites is seen everywhere in nature, "in darkness and light; in heat and cold; in the ebb and flow of waters; in male and female; in the equation of quantity and quality in the fluids of the animal body; in the systole and diastole of the heart"; and so on. That being so, we should concede further that "Every sweet hath its sour; every evil its good." Nature's adjustments and balancing are remarkable too:

> For every thing you have missed, you have gained something else; and for every thing you gain, you lose something. If riches increase, they are increased that use them. If the gatherer gathers too much, Nature takes out of the man what she puts into his chest; swells the estate, but kills the owner. Nature hates monopolies and exceptions. ("Compensation")

Taking his stand on the laws of equity and justice, adjustments and balancing, action and reaction, Emerson gives us the bold assurance:

> The nature and soul of things takes on itself the guaranty of the fulfilment of every contract, so that honest service cannot come to loss. . . . Every stroke shall be repaid. The longer the payment is withholden, the better for you, for compound interest on compound interest is the rate and usage of this exchequer. ("Compensation")

For those who feel disappointed and unduly wronged, Emerson has the following message:

> Fear not, then, thou child infirm,
> There 's no god dare wrong a worm
> Laurel crowns cleave to deserts
> And power to him who power exerts;
> Hast not thy share? On winged feet,
> Lo! it rushes thee to meet;
> And all that Nature made thy own,
> Will rive the hills and swim the sea
> And, like thy shadow, follow thee.

S. N. L. Shrivastava

THE EXISTENTIAL PROTEST

[Our esteemed friend, **Mr. Hugh I'A. Fausset,** reflects in this essay on the "movement of protest directed equally against a kind of thought which seemed to reduce man, as a complex being in a complex situation, to a disembodied consciousness and against a science which regarded him as a merely reasoning animal or a mere object among objects." His insight into the intellectual and moral problems of the movement is sympathetic; but he sees also its limitations. His hints as to the possible path out of this state towards a valid and genuinely spiritual experience are illuminating.—Ed.]

What has come to be known in the Western world as "Existentialism" represents a revolt which began in the nineteenth century against the depersonalizing of man by analytical thought and by the practical application of such thought, through the mechanism of industrialism, to his social life. The threat to man's integrity can be seen to have been implicit in the rationalism of Descartes, but it was first clearly recognized by Schelling and later by Kierkegaard in their criticisms of Hegel's philosophy.

From that time more and more creative writers contributed, consciously and unconsciously, to a movement of protest directed equally against a kind of thought which seemed to reduce man, as a complex being in a complex human situation, to a disembodied consciousness and against a science which regarded him as a merely reasoning animal or a mere object among objects. The need to affirm man's distinctive humanity became increasingly necessary as science extended its knowledge of and its power over physical nature and denied reality to any realm but the material.

The consequences of such a distorted view of life and the peril in which man stood through the devaluation of his real being became appallingly clear in the lurid light of two world wars. What in such nineteenth-century writers as Dostoievsky or Nietzsche was still a passionate, if anarchical, expression of faith in life, has become for those who lived through the massacres of Passchendaele and the Somme and the calculated demonism of Belsen, Dresden, and Hiroshima, a defiant stand against despair.

Yet man's inhumanity to man is a perennial fact of human history. Attila was as ruthless as Hitler and the victims of the Thirty Years' War were murdered as indiscriminately as their modern counterparts. For Christians, too, the infamy of Calvary has been a constant reminder of the cruel underworld ever ready to erupt into the human order which civilization seeks to impose.

It is not the fact or the scale of the horrors which modern man has witnessed which has shaken his faith in himself and in life. It is the sense

which he has, to a far greater degree than his predecessors, that he is powerless to limit or control them and that they reveal, as in a nightmare spectacle, the disease which has eaten into himself.

The religious man of an earlier age was conscious of his sins and was not allowed to forget them. Like all men he suffered in some degree from a sense of guilt and of doubt and recognized that in this world he was subject to fate and to death. But he still divined, however obscurely, a realm of being through which he could be forgiven for his sins and in which his life might be redeemed from death. His faith, often unconscious, in the reality of this realm was stronger than the facts of a world in which the forces of humanity and savagery were engaged in fearful combat. So he could live through horrors without being brought to despair, because he was not yet alienated from his real being.

This alienation is the disease of contemporary Western man and it is due to the morbid development of a one-sided rationalism. This is the enemy, at first insidious but increasingly aggressive, against which creative men have been fighting for more than a century. Faith is an affirmative act of the whole man which contains within it the clarifying and discriminating power of reason. But when faith declines into self-interested belief, rationality rises up to oppose it and becomes itself a form of belief. Thus belief in the power of science to ensure the progressive betterment of mankind and ultimately solve all human problems became current in the middle years of the nineteenth century and rapidly ousted religious belief from the mind and heart of industrialized man. But two world wars, equipped by science with weapons of destruction which threaten the survival of the human race, have revealed how naive and hollow such a belief always was.

Consequently man has been thrown back upon himself and is consumed by an anxiety which, if inherent in his situation as a self-conscious animal aspiring to be fully human, has been unbearably intensified in the present phase of his development. For today the very core of his being, in virtue of which he is a whole, is menaced, inwardly by the arid analytical mind, and outwardly by the mechanical monsters which its ingenuity has contrived and multiplied. This is the situation which the modern Existentialist confronts. He reasserts the right of every human being to be himself. But what it is to be oneself, and what it costs have been so variously interpreted that the name, Existentialism, has come to cover almost as much falsehood as truth.

A self-conscious adult cannot really be himself until he knows who and what he is. To be is an act of faith, of affirmation and commitment. To know is an act of awareness which, uniting with faith, illuminates it and ensures the truth of its acts. In modern times, however, the conflict be-

tween faith, whether instinctive or intuitive, and the analysing mind has become so acute that the integrating power of the soul has been greatly weakened. Kierkegaard and Newman in the nineteenth century were as anti-rationalist as Heidegger and Sartre in the twentieth. But they still had resources of faith associated with traditional belief which could withstand the inroads of scepticism. They, too, insisted on the need for the individual to be himself, but by exercising his right to make a moral choice. He must experience truth and error directly and in judging between them he must depend on the judgements of others only in so far as these confirmed his own inner convictions. But in the deep and tested convictions to which the individual conscience consented they assumed that the voice of God spoke, that the originality of his moral insight was heaven-sent, and that his truest reason was governed by eternal principles. To them, therefore, the problem of reconciling being and knowing was never divorced from a background of accepted and acceptable meaning.

It is quite otherwise with contemporary Existentialists, if we exclude such religious thinkers as Gabriel Marcel who, though associated with the movement, are aware that "we are arched over by a living reality that is incomparably more alive than our own." For most professed Existentialists of today the world of faith contemplated by spiritual vision has dissolved in the acids of the rationalism which they now wish to purge from their systems. They live in an empirical world and regard all claims to grasp anything beyond it with suspicion and hostility. The supra-temporal world is, for them, not a real dimension accessible to all in the degree that they are qualified to experience it and informing the physical world with order and meaning. It is a stultifying abstraction, the result of trying to think outside ourselves. Unfortunately a good deal of idealistic thinking deserves their strictures, being a kind of refined intellectualism, an exercise in subtle and abstruse logic unrooted in life or straining upwards from a shallow soil.

But it remains true that the core of our being is metaphysical and so far as twentieth-century man denies this, he and his world lose all real meaning. Hence the sickness of soul which no distractions can appease and the anxiety, indifference, or disgust, imaged in Eliot's *The Waste Land* or, more recently, in Samuel Beckett's *Dust-bins*, whose grotesque occupants have abandoned all hopes of "Godot" and are waiting for corruption to dissolve into extinction.

Nevertheless we are asked to admire the courage with which the anti-religious man of today confronts in himself the threat of death triumphant over life. Determined at all costs to be true to his own experience, however limited or perverse this may be, he rejects the consolations of any faith which his limited reason discredits or of an idealism which seems

to reprove his natural instincts. At all costs he must be himself. Yet carried to its extreme, as in some of the heroes of Sartre's novels and plays, such a claim can only lead to a freedom of absolute isolation, since relationship depends upon surrender of the self to a creative Power, felt, if not known, which brings all that is dual and separated into unity with itself.

Those, in fact, who deny the transcendental because in their view to accept it is intellectually discreditable may have the satisfaction of thinking their own thoughts. But they shut reality out. On the other hand it is quite possible to regard the God of theistic religions as a myth which we need to outgrow, or to reject what William Blake called "abstract philosophy warring in enmity against Imagination," while entering more deeply into the mystery from which we derive our awareness. But to deny this mystery because it is intellectually indefinable and humanly humbling is to deny the heaven upon which the whole of earthly existence depends for its health and harmony.

However speciously we protest our need to be entirely ourselves within the existing human situation, we shall remain self-centred if we fail to acknowledge the higher sphere of being within and beyond existence which can alone make us whole and human. Nor can we experience this heavenly dimension by extending our mental powers. Such mental expansion is no more and no less significant than modern space-travel, so long as we remain qualitatively unchanged. To experience the reality which we call heavenly and supernatural we need to relate ourselves more and more intimately to a Power which is itself infinitely whole and comprehends every part which it creates.

The man, therefore, who clings to finitude can never find a way through the predicament which his unenlightened nature presents. For in a real sense the heavenly dimension does lie outside us. It lies outside all that is self-centredly separate and which thwarts our potentiality for creative experience. Attachment to the concrete is as fatal to such experience as attachment to the abstract, because both are self-centred and prevent that marriage of the ideal and the actual of which reality is born.

So far as Existentialism is a revolt against such mental and mechanical abstraction it is vitally necessary in a world which has succumbed to them and in which what Teilhard de Chardin called "an aging Christianity that no longer informs the material world" fails to engender in its believers the organic faith and insight which can redeem the situation which an unsanctified science has brought into being. We may even find a parallel between the Existentialist denial of the God of conventional worship and the systems of thought associated with it and the Buddha's rejection of the religious and philosophic speculations of his time. When faith and knowledge, which should unite together in the man who is growing spiri-

tually, have faded into ineffective belief and restless cerebration, an absolute scepticism may well be the necessary prelude to a new and real beginning.

In many people for whom living has become a painful and pointless habit such negative disillusionment may seem to contain no possibility of a positive issue, still less of the emergence of that fully conscious humanity in which the man whose primal integrity has been destroyed by the analytical mind may become whole on a new level. But if, as Dietrich Bonhoeffer believed, something new is being born which is not discernible in the alternatives of the present and we need to become "men, pure and simple" to receive and embody it, then the carapace of the past may well have to be broken for that new spirit to be released. Perhaps, as Sartre puts it, man is "condemned" in this age to assert his freedom and individuality against everything that conspires to suppress or neutralize them, because such assertion, if carried to its extreme, will expose him to the pain, loneliness, and despair which is the human lot when existence, at any level, is divorced from cosmic being.

Instead, therefore, of abandoning the scepticism which has sapped for us the validity of traditional belief and moral conventions we may need to carry it further until we reach consciously those original depths in ourselves in which we are nothing. For in that nothing we may find that a newly grounded faith springs up, dissolving our sense of isolation because, through it, we are restored to the whole to which we belong and are singularly at one with all that lives.

This experience is no new one in our human story. Gautama passed through it under the Bodhi tree. And every mystic who has lived faithfully through the "dark night" of apparent desertion by the Power which previously sustained him has known it. He, too, like the Existentialist of today, has lost his God or at least has felt forsaken by Him. He, too, has had to take despair upon himself and to bear the burden of it as "a man, pure and simple," unconsoled by any creed or philosophy supplied from without.

But few of those who profess Existentialism today have participated deeply enough in that despair which they claim that existence has forced upon them to become vessels for a new faith in the possibility of transformation both for themselves and for a world which has lost its meaning. Indeed the rejection of idealism and traditional values in the name of fidelity to what is real and actual has manifestly encouraged in contemporary art an unhealthy absorption in the cruelty, violence and perversity which lurk in the degraded depths of human nature, an absorption seldom or insufficiently redeemed, as it is in the works of real genius, by a vision of the great norms of the spiritual world, the beauty, goodness, and truth

which man is meant to embody. For we descend into the manifold density of existence only to rise within it into the transparency of being, and it is by the growth and perfecting of selfless awareness that these two movements of descent and ascent unite in mutual fulfilment.

The traditional idea of an Absolute may have encouraged people to indulge in a metaphysical flight into a super-sensory world, while failing to enter fully into life and actualize its truth. Kierkegaard condemned such flight in what he called the "aesthetic man" as a particularly dangerous form of self-deception, because it involved no costly personal choice, as truly ethical and religious living do.

But the rejection of an Absolute can be even more stultifying, if it closes the channel through which the Light of heaven flows in to man's earth-bound consciousness. To what extent can Existential thinking, through its bias against the metaphysical, be said to obscure this Light and to encourage men to be themselves without sufficiently realizing what the real principle of Being is?

In a second article I will try to answer this question in reference particularly to the thought of Heidegger, perhaps the most influential exponent of contemporary Existentialism.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

SNAKE

Coiled like a spring
Endowed with subtle force
Your sinuous form
Seems stilled in sleep,
No hint of menace
In those glorious hues,
Yet danger is an artist
In deceit
And beauty here
Is but a camouflage.

HERBERT BLUEN

THE BASIC DICHOTOMY

[**Mr. Bjorn Merker**, who comes from Sweden, is a worker for peace who has been associated with various peace movements in his home country, especially the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society and the World Federalist Movement. Having come into contact with the writings of Mahatma Gandhi, he formed a Study and Action Group of Non-violence in Sweden. He wrote a number of essays on non-violence to be used by this Group. At present he is doing an year and a half's voluntary service for the Indian Shanti Sena, in an attempt, as he says, "to draw the attention of my fellow countrymen to the necessity of constructive efforts for peace."

He has always been deeply interested in philosophy and religion, and is at present exploring the possibilities of a deeper philosophical foundation for non-violence. This essay is part of that exploration.—Ed.]

There is no more universal endeavour than Man's attempt to reconcile his longing for unity on one hand and the diversity of existence on the other. In one form or another this is the substance of all religion, philosophy, and science. Non-violence in the Indian context, both historically and pragmatically, does not remain unaffected by this quest. Thus today a great deal of effort is spent in trying to determine the direction of non-violent development so as to deepen and broaden its concepts. What results have been obtained so far? The general trend is indicated by the arrival of terms like "non-opposition," "non-violent assistance," and "spiritual non-violence." Let us look a little closer at what this indicates.

The idea seems to be to arrive at a "purified" form of non-violence, avoiding the "combatant" means of Direct Action and resistance, which are considered limited and crude. Thought goes to the kind of non-violence described in the religious literature of India, "in the face of which all evil vanishes." This has led to a process of "distillation," and the first stage has produced a concept of non-violence cleaned of the negative forms of action such as opposition, resistance, negation. The constructive, affirmative, assisting attitude has become firmly established. This trend may be summed up in the phrase "through non-opposition to all."

This expression implies the notion that the earlier "resisting" forms of non-violence create barriers between the *satyagrahi* and his opponent, and represents an attempt at avoiding such barriers. It must be noted here that Gandhi spared no efforts in explaining that only an imperfect application of the doctrine of resistance and non-violent non-co-operation built these barriers. The limitation is not in the principle, which indeed is a chief means of unity with the opponent, but in our weakness.

At present a second distillation seems to be in process, aiming at the elimination of physical action in favour of spiritual action. This is still

embryonic, however.

It is important that we arrive at an understanding of these concepts and relate them to the quest for unity mentioned above. The future of non-violence depends on whether it fits into this larger concept or not, and on whether it is able to advance this development.

I will make no attempt to scrutinize these arguments scientifically or philosophically, but merely compare them with and relate them to other efforts in the same direction. Three concepts must be investigated in so doing:

1. The position of the Negative
2. The Dualities of existence (good-evil and so on)
3. The meaning of Unity

To begin with the last one, the quest for unity seems to be a basic feature in the evolution of man's conception of existence. Every religion abounds in hints and visions of an ultimate, all-pervading unity. This unity is most easily seen at the beginning of creation:

> There was then neither being nor non-being . . .
> Without breath breathed by its own power That One. (*Rig-Veda*, 10. 129)

But not only at the origin of things is unity seen, but also in existence:

> Him who is the One existent, sages name variously. (*Rig-Veda*, 1. 164)
> Brahma, indeed, is this whole world, this widest extent. (*Mundaka Upanishad*, 2. 2. 11)

Upon having stated this unity, however, the manifold, diverse, and contradictory elements of the world as we know it present themselves to challenge this unity, and thus:

> He desired: "Would that I were many! Let me procreate myself!" He performed austerity. Having performed austerity he created this whole world, whatever there is here. (*Taittiriya Upanishad*, 2. 6)

We are thus thrown back into dichotomy from the postulated unity. In facing the outside world man is disturbed at the lack of the basic unity envisioned in his spiritual efforts. He faces a multitude of diverse and conflicting elements and situations, and feels unable to cope with contradictions like good and evil, entities diametrically opposed and seemingly impossible healthily to unite. His universe is split and in the field of religion this takes forms like God — the abode of all good — and Satan — the total evil. History becomes the unending struggle between these powers. In a wider, existential sense I call this the Basic Dichotomy.

Man cannot rest satisfied with this dichotomy. He struggles to overcome it. The developments in the field of non-violence must be seen as an

attempt to take up the challenge of reaching Unity. Before we examine this, however, some earlier attempts throw a little light over the problem.

Hegel's philosophy tried to bridge the gap by means of dialectics. He postulated a dialectical series consisting of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis. This Synthesis would represent Unity if it were not for the perceptible inexhaustible diversity experienced around us. This forced Hegel to introduce the emergence of a new antithesis responding to the established synthesis, leading to a further synthesis, and so on. Thus the primary dichotomy he sought to overcome is merely lifted to a higher, dialectical, plane, but does not vanish.

A simpler attempt at solution has been to turn towards philosophical relativism, saying that "things are not what they appear to be," good is not necessarily or really good, evil is not evil. Even though borrowing terminology from science, this school of thought has nothing to do with scientific relativism. The latter is concerned only with the relativity of relations. It investigates the objects in relation to each other but cannot say anything about the object's relation to itself. So the "nothing is certain" way of integrating existence tries for the impossible, pretending that the problem does not exist.

We now arrive at what I here will call "spiritual positivism." (Positivism should not be understood in the usual academic philosophical sense here.) It coincides more or less with the direction of the development in non-violence mentioned above. It proposes to bridge diversity by escalating on one of its components, that which is generally called the positive. By wholly and totally embracing good and directing all effort towards the positive, the constructive, the affirmative, it claims to overcome evil, consequently establishing unity. In doing this arguments like "resisting evil means to recognize and entrench it" are used. This approach tends to be accompanied, though not necessarily, by a tendency towards "spiritual" instead of physical action.

Here we are forced to investigate the position and meaning of the negative. The negative is the inevitable and necessary counterpart of the positive. The one impliés the other. The presence of the one establishes the other. The Chinese philosopher Lao-tze says: "If all the world agrees on good as being good, then evil is just as manifest" (*Tao Te King*, 2); and this holds true for positive and negative as well. They are equal, impossible to separate, and interchangeable. They are the origin of all power: electricity is the utilization of positive and negative charges, steam of high and low pressure, and so on.

The only language which adequately conveys the equality of positive and negative is Chinese. Where we say "he is sure to come" the Chinese say "he cannot not come"; and, even more explicitly, to the question

"Isn't he coming?" the Chinese answer "Yes" if they mean that he is not coming. The "not" has no private or seclusive meaning but merges with "coming" to form the concept "non-coming," an expression that can be treated as equal to any positive phrase, i.e., can be denied or affirmed.

Gandhiji had the same insight into this fundamental equality when he wrote:

> In my humble opinion, rejection is as much an ideal as the acceptance of a thing. It is as necessary to reject untruth as it is to accept truth. Human endeavour consists of an eternal series of rejections and acceptances. Non-co-operation with evil is as much a duty as co-operation with good. Weeding is as necessary to agriculture as sowing. Indeed, even whilst the crops are growing, the weeding fork, as every husbandman knows, is an instrument of almost daily use.
>
> Let me close this argument by drawing attention to the fact that the final word of the Upanishads (*Brahmavidya*) is Not. *Neti* was the best description the authors of the Upanishads were able to find for *Brahman*.

We can and must never succeed in escaping the negative. Our very ideal has is embedded in its name, *non*-violence, a-*himsa*. Resistance and non-co-operation are not inferior as ideals because they contain a negative element. As Truth and Love were the spiritual foundation of Gandhi's non-violence, so resistance to evil was the rock-bottom foundation in the realm of action. He said, "This deliberate refusal to co-operate is like the necessary weeding process that the cultivator has to resort to before sowing." And even the votaries of non-resistance do not escape the negative, resistance. "Let us not resist" implies resistance to resistance. We have to accept the negative. An ideal like detachment is not less attractive because it holds the negative element "de-." And, indeed, why should we try to escape this negative, why try to leave aside half of existence, why close one eye?

The argument that resistance means recognition of evil stumbles over itself. Why should we not recognize something actually existing? And if resistance strengthens evil it strengthens just those qualities that ultimately lead to the fall of evil. Resistance is a method of bringing evil out in the open, then confronting it with good, the antidote, and thus overcoming it, like the discharge of positive and negative electricity. Not-resisting evil actually means supporting it. The extermination of six million Jews in Hitler's gas-chambers was made possible because, as Eichmann testified, "No one protested, no one refused to co-operate." This is an urgent and weighty argument in favour of resistance. The ostrich does not escape the hunter through sticking its head in the sand!

Thus it seems that the ideal of positivism and non-resistance is not

built on a very firm foundation, either philosophically or practically. It cannot accomplish the desired unity by exalting one side of the dichotomy; that is a unity as easily shattered as a dream on waking up. Then what is the solution?

There is no solution in the sense that we will ever be able to erase the fundamental diversity, the conflict between good and evil; but our relationship to it has to be understood and, if properly understood, may be termed a solution. We are encountering the same problem that the thinkers of the great Upanishads faced after having failed to reach the much-longed-for unity along the path of realism (early Vedas), on the path of grasping the outside world. They were unable to overcome the split between self and non-self, however deep the two were set in a monistic frame. Then, as the final release, the path of epistemological idealism opened the vista of unity. The final unity could not and would not be found outside of the Self, but in it. In truth, the Self was the unity they had been looking for all the time, because "therein all these things become one." Through knowing the great Self, through realizing *Atman,* the *Atman*-knower transcends good and evil and all other pairs of opposites in attaining the higher state of self-realization. Without, the dichotomy reigns supreme; evil stands beside good, truth beside untruth, and each calls for its form of action; but within they are united in consciousness, the very entity which once produced them. Transcendence of diversity and ascent to a higher state of consciousness in itself implies taking a stand on the whole of diversity, one leg on good and one leg on evil. Only then do we find stability enough to make the leap. Thus we arrive at, not a state of affirmation of any particular part of existence like truth or good, but a state void of all ethical distinctions, merging with all of existence in total liberation.

And this applies to the development of non-violence as well. In our self "all these," that is, evil and good, resistance and assistance, Truth and untruth, acceptance and rejection, become one. It is our consciousness that relates us to the world. Man is placed in this world, squarely into the multitude of existence. With him he brings the power of Yes and No. How beautiful they are, how lovable, the Yes and the No, assistance and resistance, the positive and the negative, equal, both of brilliance, like our two hands! They are not contradictory, but complementary. The unity lies, not in embracing only one of the two, but in having both at our command. The non-violence of rejection and acceptance resolves the basic dichotomy by resisting evil and assisting good out of ONE motivation and meeting them with one force, Love. As Lao-tze says:

> To the Good I am good,
> and to the evil I am also good.

To the truthful I am true,
and to the untruthful I am also true.
(*Tao Te King*, 49)

"Being good to" certainly implies action of some form or other. The gap closes through meeting both sides with the same attitude. Non-violence faced with good means the strengthening of good, flowering creation; faced with evil it means the latter's ultimate destruction through resistance, that is, through love. We will advance towards good only to the extent that we are able to generate a surplus of love and compassion, i.e., more than what is neutralized by evil. There are no shortcuts to perfection.

Thus it becomes clear that man is both the origin of the dicotomy (through perception) and its dissolution (through conscious activity). It is up to us to restore the balanced, transcending unity which we ourselves have shattered. It cannot be done through manipulating our relation to the outside world, but only by bringing our inner Self in accord with all existence.

Being and non-Being produce each other
Heavy and light complete each other
High and low maintain each other.... (*Tao Te King*, 2)

BJORN MERKER

CEASE NOT to think of the Universe as one living Being, possessed of a single Substance and a single Soul; and how all things trace back to its single aliveness; and how it does all things by a single impulse; and how all existing things are joint causes of all things that come into existence; and how intertwined in the fabric is the thread and how closely woven the web.

—MARCUS AURELIUS

THE POETRY OF W. H. DAVIES

[**Mr. Herbert Bluen**, an old friend of THE ARYAN PATH, gives us an appreciative sketch of the life and writings of W. H. Davies which is refreshing.
—ED.]

THE poems of W. H. Davies are mostly so simple and direct that a child could understand them. They have an attractive freshness and the best of them are like small flawless gems. They reveal a nature with a child's capacity for wonderment in a world where each new day with its ups and downs is an exciting adventure. This infectious enthusiasm for life is doubtless one of the reasons why early hardships failed to break his spirit and why his poetry is essentially that of a happy man. Davies is a keen observer of nature in all her moods and even the humblest flower is a miracle in his eyes, but although he delights in rustic solitude he delights also in the company of his fellow men, and for the weak and defenceless he has great compassion.

Born in Newport, Monmouth, on 20 April 1871, William Henry Davies, to give him his full name, was of Welsh parentage. He was brought up by his grandfather and grandmother, his father being dead and his mother having remarried. At the age of twenty-two he was apprenticed to a picture-frame-maker but gave up the trade and went to America, where he worked as fruit-picker and cattle-man. After several visits to England he went to Canada where he lost his right leg as the result of an accident while "train-jumping" at Renfrew, Ontario. Returning to England he started to write, keeping himself meanwhile by peddling laces and singing in the streets. In 1905 he published his first book of verse, *The Soul's Destroyer,* and sent it to various well-known people, including Bernard Shaw, who befriended him and helped to establish his reputation. This was much enhanced in 1907 by the publication of *The Autobiography of a Super-Tramp,* and in 1911 official recognition of his work gained him a Civil List Pension.

Davies's early life as a homeless wanderer, so vividly described in *The Autobiography of a Super-Tramp,* had a considerable influence on his poetry. It is indeed possible that he might never have written so well or even at all, had he always experienced a settled way of life. He had a restless nature which made him fear the ties and responsibilities of marriage, but in 1922 he met Helen Payne, a twenty-one-year-old hospital nurse, whom he married, and despite the disparity in their ages the marriage proved a happy one.

Davies's understanding of a tramp's psychology is revealed in "The Jolly Tramp," which portrays a man who is partly a philosopher, partly a likable rogue:

What though I read few books, I can read men,
And weigh a face for what the heart is worth,
Far better than the fools who think they know.

Davies is aware of a happiness which can be shared by all men whose minds are sufficiently humble and receptive. He is filled with gratitude for the marvellous gift of life, a gratitude which he endeavours to communicate to us in brief, often ecstatic, poems. He is not, however, a poet remarkable only for his lyrical exuberance. Many of his poems reveal a man who has pondered deeply on the fundamental questions of existence and who has evolved a philosophy based on personal experience rather than on knowledge derived from books. His life was certainly richer than most men's in its variety, as we shall realize when we consider the vicissitudes of his early years as a tramp and compare them with his later years, when not only his poetry but also his personal charm won him the close friendship of distinguished people.

In "The Soul's Destroyer," a long, rather desultory poem, Davies expresses admiration for London's grandeur and romance, yet in that great city he is haunted by the sufferings of the poor and homeless and distressed by his inability to succour them. It is amid the haunts of nature that he is happiest and perhaps his love of nature was never more beautifully expressed than in "The Kingfisher":

Nay, lovely Bird, thou art not vain;
Thou hast no proud, ambitious mind;
I also love a quiet place
That 's green, away from all mankind;
A lonely pool, and let a tree
Sigh with her bosom over me.

In some of his poems Davies shows a delightful sense of humour and it soon becomes hard to regard him as a stranger whom we meet only through the medium of the printed page. He is a highly impressionable poet who often finds matter for serious reflection in apparently trivial events and he has a gift for crystallizing his thoughts into a few vivid lines. In, for instance, "The Example" he depicts a butterfly lying on a rough, hard rock and finds a moral in its apparent contentment:

Now let my bed be hard,
No care take I;
I'll make my joy like this
Small Butterfly;
Whose happy heart has power
To make a stone a flower.

Owing to the great speed of modern life many people find it difficult to relax even when the opportunity occurs and suffer in consequence from various nervous disorders. For these unfortunates "Leisure," although written long before the atomic age, has a special message and significance. This poem, one of his best known, is a superb example of the power of simple words and emphasizes the futility of a life obsessed with mundane affairs and blind to what is lovely and inspiring:

> A poor life this if, full of care,
> We have no time to stand and stare.

Although Davies believes that a man should follow the precepts of religion to be kind to the poor and the oppressed he has no orthodox religious faith, as he admits in "Christ the Man." The elaborate ritual of formal worship has no appeal for him. His temple is nature and his vision of God is embodied in nature's miraculous beauty. His vocabulary is limited, yet he has an innate sense of the music and rhythm of words, as for instance in "Thunderstorms," which is how he describes his occasional fits of depression:

> Yet come, dark thunderstorms,
> And brood your heavy hours;
> For when you rain me words,
> My thoughts are dancing flowers
> And joyful singing birds.

Unlike many contemporary poets Davies is seldom introspective, yet just because of his un-self-consciousness most of his poems are vivid self-revelations. In this respect, and in some others, he resembles Walter de la Mare. Occasionally Davies uses his simple style to good effect on subjects outside his usual scope. In, for instance, "The White Monster" he vividly recaptures the atmosphere of menace brooding over English homes during the First World War Zeppelin raid:

> Oh, it was strange to see a thing like jelly,
> An ugly, boneless thing all back and belly,
> Among the peaceful stars — that should have been
> A mile deep in the sea, and never seen:
> A big, fat, lazy slug that, even then,
> Killed women, children, and defenceless men.

Some of Davies's poems are marred by *clichés* and seem more like mere exercises in versification than the fruit of genuine inspiration. There are occasions too when his sensitivity degenerates into sentimentality and his longer poems are on the whole of indifferent quality. He has a photographic mind which is a rich storehouse of memories and in "Wonderful Places" he vividly evokes for us a vision of nature's awe-inspiring grandeur:

Again I see the mighty leap
Made by the wild Pacific deep
At Rarotonga, off a coral bed....

Davies is a great lover of animals and in his deeply moving poem "The Ox" he expresses sorrow that so many gentle, beautiful, and harmless creatures are doomed to be slaughtered for man's food, and he despises the gluttonous and insensitive man who regards animals merely as a means to satisfy that gluttony. He takes great pleasure in the faithful companionship of domestic animals and in "Broken Hearts" he gives us a charming picture of his dog resting his head upon his master's foot. It is a cold, hard "bed," yet it comforts the dog, who cares not whether his master is humble or great:

The King is dead, by millions mourned,
That bared their heads, or wept, or sighed;
The dog, that waited for him in vain,
Has broken its heart, and died.
So end two lives, and one so small a thing —
It never knew its Master was a King.

Davies, who died on 26 September 1940, candidly admitted that he would rather have remained a tramp than earn his living at uncongenial work. Fortunately for him, recognition won him financial independence although of a modest nature. This, however, was sufficient for Davies, who seems to have discovered early in life that true happiness is independent of wealth. His own success emphasized no doubt for him the tragedy of neglected genius, and in "Time's Justice" he expresses the belief that

The great man's work, when his life 's past,
Will ripen like plucked fruit at last....

Davies has been severely censured by some critics who prefer a more sophisticated style. It is, however, that very lack of sophistication which many poetry-lovers find so refreshing, and despite his faults and limitations he is unquestionably sincere and has bequeathed to posterity some exquisite lyric poetry.

HERBERT BLUEN

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

A QUATERCENTENARY TRIBUTE TO SHAKESPEARE *

NOWADAYS, all Shakespeare scholars must be faced with a dilemma: the ocean of research or, as Professor Iyengar aptly calls them, the "Himalayas" of argument and fact. The distinguished author is too wise and knowledgeable to be lured into the fatal error of assessing the world's literary giants in an order of merit. He, for example, puts Goethe aside (not into second or third place) as "a phenomenon apart and unique."

The sheer size and scope of this volume are truly massive. Moreover, the depth and width of the synoptic view are a triumph of Professor Iyengar's scholarship. The special feature of this creative research on the occasion of the Quatercentenary Year is that in spite of the colossal material in question the book is well planned and most readable. But already in his *The Adventure of Criticism* the author has proved himself a master of mature vision in his intellectual enterprises.

The book comprises minute studies into Shakespeare's life, marriage, society, literary conventions, text, style, and recent evaluations. Yet the author modestly calls his book an "Introduction to Shakespeare," claiming no sensational discoveries. But Professor Iyengar is, beyond doubt, a highly original thinker, particularly when drawing parallels and challenging authoritative opinions. The secret of the force of his scholarship lies in the fact that he starts from a fundamentally essential principle, viz., "to understand a part one must understand the whole."

The wealth of material is dealt with deftly and gracefully. There is the chapter on Shakespeare as a thinker, on the impact of Copernicus, Montaigne, and Machiavelli on the climate of thinking in Shakespeare's time. Again and again, references point to our situation and above all to India: thus Leonardo da Vinci's daring intuition anticipates Sri Aurobindo's conception of man's obsession with "divine frenzy for a remote ideal." The section on Shakespeare's vocabulary and verbal originality is equally fascinating. There are chapters on the interconnections between the various plays: e.g., in *Titus Andronicus* the author sees the germs of "Lear's self-wrought isolation, Othello's grave naïveté, and Hamlet's ambiguous madness." As to the Sonnets, the author endeavours "to rid our minds of needless prepossessions and meaningless cant."

Professor Iyengar's range of research in this momentous book naturally emphasizes Shakespeare as the dramatic artist. He sees the Shakespearean Tragedy and Comedy as connected with certain archetypal human situations: "Shakespeare touched both character and plot with universality and imposed on them his individual vision of the human predicament on earth and what man may hope for." The audience is in no doubt that the fates of the characters reflect our fate: *Tua res agitur*! Who is not Lear when, in family, office, or society, the younger generation challenges the old order? Or is Eugène Ionesco not right when in Richard II's fate he sees the fate of all deposed kings in the world? In his historical

* *Shakespeare: His World and His Art.* By K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR. (Asia Publishing House, Bombay. 711 pp. Illustrated. 1964. Rs. 30.00)

plays Shakespeare projected his own vision of mankind, his own and our own story, our own timeless truth, our own ego. Professor Iyengar's own interpretation of *Richard II* is profound as well as subtle:

> The short view blurs the vision. . . . Take a somewhat longer view, and death is seen to be the monotonous end of criminal and victim alike. Take a still longer view, and a pattern of moral causation *seems* to emerge. . . . Richard is here revealed as his own enemy; his greatest traitor . . . the one that is lodged *within*. . . . Bolingbroke wins the throne, but Richard too has won something — the crown of self-knowledge. If legitimacy is not enough, mere ability too is not enough.

Perhaps the most powerful and moving chapters are those on "Great Tragedy" and "Later Tragedy." Though aware of the contemporary resistance to the possibilities of tragedy ("Our sensibilities are numbed . . ."), the author does not fall a victim to generalizations. He expresses the hope "that the poetic word and tragic poetry still somehow retain the residual power to tilt the balance of forces and ensure human survival." In connection with his *Lear* interpretation the author brilliantly compares our experience as to the great Shakespearean heroes with the sensation of looking at "one of the great architectural wonders of the world": the magnificent tomb Gol Gumbaz.

Professor Iyengar is mindful of the common centre of tragedy and comedy — a fact which is so easily blurred or even forgotten in modern criticism. Both tragedy and comedy aim at a cathartic effect on the spectator: tragedy through the enactment of the deadly conflict between freedom and necessity; comedy through the theatrical travesty and debunking of our human situation or of the world beyond. Both tragedy and comedy wield the destructive weapon of the human intellect, but on different levels. In this connection we should like to refer to Friedrich Schlegel, who in "*Athenäum*" and "*Lyzeumsfragment*" speaks of the crushing power of wit. Wit, to him, is an explosion of the imprisoned mind, the outward lightning of man's imagination. Wit is divine and not foreign to mystic writing. However, on a lower level, wit is "the surprise-meeting of two friendly thoughts after a long period of separation" ("*Athenäum*").

We have already referred to Professor Iyengar's comparative approach to the Shakespearean problem. Readers will welcome his comparison between *Othello* and the *Shakuntalam*, a comparison which has been carefully elaborated by his daughter, Dr. Prema Nandakumar, in *The Indian P.E.N.*, February 1960. The Volumnia-Coriolanus scene "recalls the great scene in the *Mahabharata*." As to the "wading through poison and reaching nectar" "*amritam vishasamsrishtam*, in Valmiki's resplendent phrase," is referred to. Hermione, again, recalls Shakuntala. As regards soliloquy, "the *ādikavi* Valmiki puts into Hanuman's mouth in the *Sundara Kanda* of the *Ramayana* some of the most amazing soliloquies in world literature." Above all, Shakespeare is revealed to us as not only the creative genius and renewer of old conventions but also an astonishingly modern psychologist.

Professor Iyengar has with this quatercentenary tribute to Shakespeare erected a monument which will, for a long time, remain a most memorable and important homage to one of the world's greatest literary geniuses.

A. CLOSS

LAO TZU: *Tao Te Ching*. Translated with an Introduction by D. C. LAU. (Penguin Classics. Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex. 192 pp. 1963. 3*s*. 6*d*.).

From the cover of this book beams

the face of Lao Tzu, taken from a Chinese silk painting, a hypothetical portrait of a legendary personage. Tradition generally assigns him to the sixth century B.C., but, according to D. C. Lau, there is no historical evidence and the *Tao Te Ching* is probably a third-fourth–century–B.C. anthology, though including earlier material. The book contains a surprising amount for its size, blending the scholarly with ease of style. In addition to the translation and long introduction, there is a list of passages for comparison, some detective work on the authorship and nature of the book, a brief Chronological Table, Glossary, and Notes. For the reader more intent on the ideas associated with Lao Tzu, the translation will be found easy reading.

One may consider that in deprecating "the mysterious elements" and treating it as "a rather down-to-earth philosophy" concerned with personal survival and the art of government, Mr. Lau has missed something of value, but the following brief examples of his translation will show the pleasing common sense of the ancient compilation:

> He who knows others is clever.
> He who knows himself has discernment.
> He who overcomes others has force;
> He who overcomes himself is strong.
>
> Without stirring abroad
> One can know the whole world;
> Without looking out of the window
> One can see the way of heaven.

L. MARR

Development of Religion in South India. By K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI. (Orient Longmans, Madras. 143 pp. 1963. Rs. 8.00)

Based upon one of the lectures on the subject which the learned author delivered at the University of Chicago, this book is an illuminating study of the development of religion in South India. The author traces the origin and evolution of the leading religious movements and philosophies of that region and makes his own assessment of the contribution which their leaders made to the social and cultural awakening and betterment of the people in general.

India is unique in the history of the world in that it has an unbroken saintly tradition, and that in every walk of life. In our country religion means *dharma,* the aggregate of all that uplifts man, upholds the moral order, and supports faith in God. The basic element of religion is to be found in the real needs of the human being, in an urge both universal and fundamental to human nature. At a time when social and cultural life was disintegrating and there was no binding force either in the field of politics or culture, it was religion that kept people together, binding them with common chains of faith and belief. This brought about a sort of emotional integration among the people living in South India. It was men of religion who assumed leadership of the people in an hour of emotional vacuum and artistic void. As philosophy and religion are not divorced from each other in India, the great Indian philosophers have all been saints. By combining religion with wisdom, they put forth values and teaching which have had an eternal importance and significance. Many religious movements were led by eminent saints who were great thinkers as well. The inspiration for even social reform has often sprung from saintliness. It is not social service in the conventional sense that the saints perform. It is service of God in his creatures or manifestations. There is a golden thread that runs through the lives and the teachings of all the prophets, seers, and sages in the world's history. They are witnesses to one and the same Spirit. They discover a spiritual unity of all beings.

Written in a lucid and graceful style, the book is marked by ease and felicity in language.

SURENDRANATH AGNIHOTRI

The Form of A Servant: A Historical Analysis of the Kenotic Motif. By DONALD G. DAWE. (Westminster Press, Philadelphia. 218 pp. 1963. $4.50)

The purpose of this book

> is to explore historically the *Kenotic* tradition in Christological thought. In this tradition the incarnation is interpreted as an act of divine self-emptying or limitation.

The doctrine of *Kenosis* is the "self-limitation" or "self-emptying" of God in taking upon Himself the human form. Is God both human and divine? Does God cease to be God in becoming human? The "self-limitation" of God's nature is a freedom of God; and yet it is a reality of His nature which remains unchanged. These are questions which concern philosophic theism in general. But the Kenotic Motif is of special concern to Christology because the Christian Faith is founded on it. Says Dr. Dawe:

> According to the Christian faith God in his creation and redemption of the world accepted the limitation of finitude upon his own person. God accepted the limitations of human life, its suffering and death, but in doing this, he had not ceased being God.

Although Christianity, Judaism, and Islam belong to the group called "Semitic religions," yet it is the Kenotic Motif that was, as Dr. Dawe says, to the Jews, a "stumbling block"; to the Greeks, "foolishness"; to the followers of Islam, "blasphemy." And even in Christianity, "the history of the Kenosis idea," says Dr. Dawe, "is marked by a curious mixture of insight and misunderstanding." "Theologians," he says, "have tried to explain it in terms of many different patterns of thought about God. But they have discovered that this idea fits into none of their patterns fully." And yet the Kenotic Motif "cuts across all the established lines of thought about God" in the Christian tradition. So it is evident that the problem which Dr. Dawe analyses in his book is of significance not only to students of Christology but to others. In nine chapters, Dr. Dawe makes a historical and systematic study of this important problem, and the book is well written and makes stimulating reading. It makes a significant contribution to the study of the problem of *Kenosis* and offers "a new look at an ancient teaching."

It may not be irrelevant to point out that the doctrine of the "self-limitation" of God through a free act of His nature to assume human form and of His yet remaining unchanged in His divine essence, is also part of the philosophic Theism of Hinduism, as, for instance, in the *Gita*. But the Kenotic Motif in Hinduism exists in the sense in which Hegel interpreted it. According to Hegel's interpretation, *Kenosis* or the "self-emptying" of God is rather an "inherent order of reality" than a "historical" happening in a place and time. The descent of God into human form is not, according to Hegel, as Dr. Dawe says, "an event that happened at this or that point in history. It is the eternal pattern of all being in its emerging consciousness as Absolute Spirit." But the New Testament idea is that it is a "historical" event. Although the Kenotic Motif cuts across, as Dr. Dawe says, all the established lines of thought about God, yet it is interpreted in various ways by philosophers and theologians within the Christian tradition. Dr. Dawe's scholarly work helps students of the history of religion, and they will find this book enlightening.

N. A. NIKAM

The Sermon on the Mount According to Vedanta. By SWAMI PRABHAVANANDA. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 110 pp. 1964. 16*s*.)

The practice is growing by which the adherents of one religion take the sacred writings of another religion, in whole or in part, and interpret them according to their own tenets and traditions. The *Bhagavad-Gita* and the *Sermon on the Mount* have often been treated so, especially by Christian and Hindu writers respectively. There is a good side to this, especially as most of the work has been done in an eirenic spirit. It is not without value for each to seek to glimpse the truth through the eyes of another with his very different premises and postulates. But in the last analysis one may doubt whether this kind of cross-interpretation has real value.

The book under review is a case in point. The author is a monk of the Ramakrishna Order who has worked for many years in the U.S.A. He has a genuine love for Jesus Christ, whose divinity he confesses in a general but not absolute way. He recognizes that the teaching given in the Sermon on the Mount is at the heart of Jesus' message and, with a perception not always found in Christians, sees that the gospel is not merely ethical but "uncompromisingly spiritual." And it is out of the characteristic spirituality of the Vedantin that he interprets the Sermon.

Much that is written will strike a chord in the heart of the Christian believer and at times the Swami seems to at least one such reader to have brought fresh light to the familiar words. Yet at the end one is left with a dissatisfaction, none the less real because hard to define, such a dissatisfaction as has been expressed by many a Hindu after reading a Christian exegesis of the *Gita*. This book seems to endorse and reinforce a recent Christian study of the Sermon which stresses the great presupposition behind it: that we have not here simply a collection of valuable moral and spiritual principles to be understood in their own light but words spoken by the Word Himself to those who have answered the question: "Whom say ye that I am?" in the absolute way that separates the Christian from the Hindu. For the Swami Jesus is honoured and revered as *one* of the greatest inspired teachers. This, from the Christian point of view limited, recognition informs and controls the interpretation. And this writer, a man of integrity, never pretends that it is otherwise.

Thus while we recognize and commend the purpose of the book we cannot but regard much of its substance with reserve and its conclusions with reluctant dissent.

MARCUS WARD

Reason, Action and Morality. By J. KEMP. (International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 208 pp. 1964. 30*s*.)

Of all philosophical disciplines ethics has attracted most attention, though ethical discussions seldom have any popular appeal. Often writers on morality are so preoccupied with clarification and analysis of concepts that the results arrived at seem to be disappointing, and one is tempted to go back to the classical achievements of Aristotle and Kant as the only solid gains in the weary proliferation on ethical thought. There has, however, been one significant development in recent ethical reflection, and this is in our awareness of ethical values and in the careful study of the language of ethics. German ethics is more concerned with the problem of values, whereas British and American ethical reflections are more interested in the analysis of the situations in which moral decisions and actions are involved and the language in which they are expressed.

Professor J. Kemp's work is in the best British tradition. It is admirably lucid in expression and precise in formulation. Following G. E. Moore, he tries to formulate the question before attempting an answer. The clarification of moral issues has led him to a study of some characteristic theories about the relation between reason and action. Hence the first part serves as a historical background for later systematic observations. A few thinkers — Cudworth, Locke, Clarke, Hume, and Kant — are considered in some detail, as their theories are directly concerned with the development of his own moral perspective.

The absence of any emphasis on the Greek contribution is unfortunate. Descartes' confidence in the ability of human reason "to discover fundamental truths unaided by divine revelation" goes back to Greek rationalism, and the plea for a life governed by reason is Socratic in origin.

Professor Kemp's criticism of intuitionism is often just and there is little in which to differ from him. But, to be fair to the intuitionist, the appeal to self-evidence cannot be completely dismissed and even a rationalist like Spinoza could not but take refuge in intuition in the last resort. The writer, however, is fully conscious of the limits of justification and nothing is more convincing than the admission contained in the concluding words:

> But it is no sign of a higher level of rationality to seek for reasons at a stage where no further reasons can in fact be given, or to seek for conclusive reasons where only partial or inconclusive reasons are available.

SYED VAHIDUDDIN

The Lonely Pilgrim (*Gandhiji's Noakhali Pilgrimage*). By MANUBAHEN GANDHI. Translated from the original Gujarati. (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad. 273 pp. 1964. Rs. 3.00)

Noakhali, 1946, is not just one more black date in the history of mankind. It differs from others in that a saintly man, over seventy years old, took upon himself the task of carrying the message of love and forgiveness into the burning homes.

With bare and bleeding feet, along paths polluted with excrement by those who wished to show their disregard for him, Gandhiji made his painful way through the charred ruins of once happy homesteads, through courtyards strewn with the bones of the murdered, past fresh patches of blood. He talked with women who, after their husbands and sons had been killed, often in their presence, were forcibly converted to the religion of the murderers and married again against their will.

During this period, from October 1944 to March 1947, Gandhiji lived on warm water and honey, fruit juice, coconuts, a few vegetables, a little milk. Body and soul could scarcely be kept together on less. He had no appetite, eating only to maintain the strength he needed. And he did not sleep more than three hours at a stretch, often less.

Sudden attacks by despoilers were still frequent and, he writes, even growing in number. His party lived and slept in the open without any security whatsoever. His seventeen-year-old granddaughter was with him. The risk he ran was great, but the danger to which she was exposed was even greater in a place so primitive in its values that women were regarded as fair game. He insisted that she stay near him so that he could give her all possible protection, making her go to bed when he did and sleep near him so that she would not be moving about unguarded. At his insistence Manubahen also kept a diary. This has now been made available in English in this book.

Gandhiji was keenly aware of the risk of bringing Manubahen to Noakhali. But how could he ask other women

to expose themselves to the dangers of Noakhali if he allowed his own family to shirk them? And he needed the care of one familiar with his habits and requirements. Manu had been with him when he was imprisoned in the Aga Khan Palace at Poona. The others who knew best how to look after him, his wife and Mahadev Desai, were dead. In taking his granddaughter, an innocent girl of seventeen, he proved the sincerity of the effort he was making. She went willingly, with her father's consent.

The atmosphere was as bad as possible. A subtle, pervasive poison of the spirit had perverted the hearts of the men of Noakhali. The symptoms of it were everywhere, like a disease. Gandhiji and his brave colleagues worked under a strain which was, not surprisingly, too much for some of them. He was tense and restless himself. Manubahen records his pain when a worker broke down and gave way. More than one did. In the end he himself was accused of evil practices! For Gandhiji this was the ultimate humiliation. His pilgrimage was a voluntary, penitential Calvary.

This day-to-day, almost hour-to-hour, record of an ordeal of great historical and spiritual significance, as seen through the eyes of a girl who scarcely knew the meaning of what she saw, is invaluable. It will be read for the interest of its subject. It is a pity the English is so poor. It is also inexcusable.

LILA RAY

The Rebel Passion: A Short History of Some Pioneer Peace-makers. By VERA BRITTAIN. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 240 pp. Illustrated. 1964. 35*s*.)

The rebel passion of this book's somewhat lurid title is, according to its epigraph from Gilbert Murray, pity, which is "the Kingdom of Heaven within us fighting against the brute powers of the world," and the book itself, "A Short History of Some Pioneer Peace-makers," memorializes the fifty years' work of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Christian pacifist body founded at Cambridge in 1914.

According to her preface, Miss Brittain carried out her task not altogether willingly, and it cannot be denied that her book shows her as a dutiful, rather than as an inspired, historian. It is on the whole a very dull book, though this is not altogether Miss Brittain's fault. It is in fact the history of a sect, more or less within the Christian churches, though at times claiming to be more Christian than they are, and a sect more or less within the pacifist movement, though at times claiming to be more pacifist than it is. And the Fellowship of Reconciliation when certain of its members and such moments of its history as the "Embassies of Reconciliation" are honourably excepted, has been an oddly uninspired and uninspiring body, with a tendency towards ultra-protestantism, lengthy preachments, and a holier-than-thou attitude not only to militarists, but also to its fellow anti-militarists. It is difficult to agree with its supposed foundation in 2 Cor. v, 17-19; for it seems doubtful whether those "new creatures" in Christ whom Paul spoke of as demonstrating God's reconciliation with man, and to whom God has given the "ministry of reconciliation," are really exemplified in the vaguely evangelical, vaguely conscience-stricken "do-gooders," clergy and lay, who are evidently the majority of the Fellowship's members; while those few of them — for example, George Lansbury and C. E. Raven — who might properly be regarded as men of profoundly religious insight, though Christians and pacifists, were much more than Christian pacifists.

Miss Brittain's task, then, was in itself a little pretentious. She does her best with it, outlining the prehistory and the history of the Fellowship to the present day and giving accounts of its

operation in the United Kingdom, the United States, and many European and Asian countries, together with brief biographies of its more notable members; and she is careful to show what a different thing reconciliation, as "the art and practice of turning enemies into friends," is, according to the country, and the political and religious atmospheres, in which its practitioners live.

R. H. WARD

A Selection of African Prose. Vol. I: Traditional Oral Texts; Vol II: Written Prose. Compiled by W. H. WHITELEY. (Oxford University Press, London. 200 and 185 pp. respectively. 1964. 21*s.* each)

As interest grows in African affairs, so anthologies of African writing appear with greater and greater frequency, and this is just as it should be. Far too little attention has been paid in the past to the achievements and the potentialities of African literature, and such anthologies must have great educational value both outside, and, perhaps even more important, within, Africa. Young Africans, particularly, need to be introduced to this literature, which might offer a more valuable stimulus to reading than the "Great Books" approach, usual in the schools. The emerging African common reader will naturally look first of all for literature which arises from the life of his own continent; and, far from leading to parochialism, this approach is more likely to initiate him into those pleasures which come from recognizing life in one's books and which open up such glowing possibilities to the young reader.

These two volumes are likely to prove very useful, and everyone concerned with the development of Africa will be glad to have them. But I am not sure that they are quite what is needed.

The first volume is very welcome, providing what is not readily available elsewhere — a widely ranging illustration of the oral literature of Africa, with an excellent Introduction. This is the more valuable of the two volumes, though I was sorry to see that Mary Smith's *Baba of Karo* was not represented. This translation of an old Hausa woman's recollections of her life, though not a "traditional" oral text, is one of the most rewarding works of oral literature to come out of Africa. But clearly one of the great difficulties of the editor must have been making an adequate representation, in a volume of only two hundred pages, of the vast range of works available to him.

This is apparent in the second volume, and the reader might be as struck by the names that do not appear as by those that do. For example, three excellent early writers are included, Equiano, Reindorf, and J. E. Casely-Hayford; but the absence of such names as Edward Blyden, Africanus Horton, Samuel Crowther, and Solomon Attoh-Ahuma gives the impression of a certain sketchiness, to be expected in a work of lighter scholarship and lower price, but rather disappointing here. For all the value and interest of the volume, one might wonder whether it offers much more than, say, Peggy Rutherford's *Darkness and Light,* published six years before. It has a useful introduction, and includes a few older writers, but apart from this it might appear in some ways to offer rather less than the earlier anthology. Now that so many excellent, low-priced anthologies of African writing are available, the editor might have offered us something on a grander scale: one recognizes at once the value of the first volume, but the second seems to me to fall between, neither inclusive enough to stand with confidence on the reference shelf, nor cheap enough to suit the needs of the ordinary reader and challenge the other anthologies.

PAUL EDWARDS

Tribal Life in Gujarat. By P. G. SHAH. (Gujarat Research Society, Bombay. Distributors: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. 344 pp. Illustrated. 1964. Rs. 20.00; 35*s*.; $9.00)

Alexander Pope said, "The proper study of mankind is Man." But then such a study will only be possible if undertaken dispassionately on precise, methodical, and scientific lines, because man (both student and studied) is a complex being affected and swayed by a variety of factors — physiological, psychological, and moral as well as economic, social, and religious.

In collecting information and data for the compilation of this volume, a strictly scientific approach has been adopted (with use of the modern scientific techniques of anthropometry and serology); and the resulting analytical survey provides coverage of almost every phase of the life of the people, both separately and collectively, in relation to the man, the woman, and the child.

The exposure to and the intervention of the descendants of the ancient Aryan and Dravidian civilizations are shown to have affected and shaped the supernaturalism, culture, and folklore of these tribes, resulting in their developing the more modern outlooks and practices of their present neighbours. The book concludes very practically on a note of future assistance that could be offered to these backward groups, both by the people and by the State, to enable their becoming better-knit units of the country's population.

A study of this nature, though factual in character, implies and emphasizes the existence side by side of more and less developed people with a variety of capacities, of physical and mental make-up. This anthropological fact corresponds to the statement in the ancient scriptures that the light of the spirit is in all beings, but in all it does not shine forth equally. The outward intensity and brilliancy of this light could be enhanced, however, by cleansing and refining the physical organism of these less developed beings, with a change in the environmental conditions brought about by the impact and the emulation of more developed and advanced groups of people. This can be achieved only by sympathy, fellowship, and brotherliness from the latter group towards the former. It is necessary that the latter group should realize its obligations and responsibilities in this respect.

The author has demonstrated the possibility of, and the scope for, improvement of the less developed. His lead could be taken up with benefit by social groups interested in the uplift, emancipation, and amelioration of their backward brethren. With additional assistance from the State and the nation, the physical and material conditions of these tribes could be changed for the better beyond recognition. The question is, Who will bell the cat, and bring about the much-needed reform? Time only can tell!

K. R. A.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE VATICAN COUNCIL IN THE LIGHT OF THEOSOPHY

Rome, 10 November 1964

FOR the past three months a vast assembly of over two thousand Roman Catholic prelates from all parts of the world have been debating in St. Peter's in Rome, under the mighty dome of Michelangelo. This is Vatican Council

II, now in its third session, under the guidance of Pope Paul VI, continuing the work begun in 1962 by Vatican Council I under his predecessor, the late Pope John XXIII.

Pope John was a warm-hearted man with a genuine sense of human brotherhood, to whom the idea of such a Council — "this flower of an unforeseen spring," as he called it — presented itself as a possible means of healing the breach between Catholics and Protestants and so making Western Christendom one. But he was in failing health even then and died in June 1963. It remains to be seen whether, without his personal inspiration, the Council will accomplish what he hoped for.

The Council receives wide-spread Press coverage, not only in the daily papers of most nations but in serious weeklies and monthlies, which devote much space to detailed studies of its proceedings. It is not to be wondered at that the world should look on with keen interest as that most conservative of all institutions, Holy Mother Church, accepts or plans for the most far-reaching changes she has ever experienced.

Theosophists look on too. "Unity" and "Human Brotherhood" are words they know well. Perhaps, also, there is a certain fascination in watching the wheels go round within the huge body of this foremost representative of organized religion. Theosophists have their own creed, if one may call it so — "There is no religion higher than Truth." And they base their judgement of every branch of sectarianism on Robert Crosbie's statement:

> Religion is a bond uniting men together, not a particular set of dogmas or beliefs . . . binding not only all men, but also *all beings and things,* into one grand whole.

This letter, however, does not seek to deal with dogmas. Its only aim is to cast the light of Theosophy on what is undeniably a great and interesting historic happening — the Church of Rome taking stock of itself. Much, inevitably, concerns Catholics only and cannot matter to most ARYAN PATH readers. For example, the involved definition of the Pope's relationship with the bishops and of the bishops' prerogatives, the assessment of the precise degree of "infallibility" pertaining to the one and to the other, which makes the present council complementary to its predecessor, the Council of 1875.

There has also been the mighty concession that the Mass may now be said "in the vernacular," meaning that English Catholics (to mention only these) are no longer obliged to worship God in Latin only. Quite as astonishing is the possibility that, at some far future date, celibacy may cease to be demanded of the clergy; meanwhile, an order of married deacons is to be allowed to assist the priests in parish work. And more scope is to be afforded to the laity to make their own contribution of usefulness. (On this point Protestantism has always been enlightened, wise, and practical.)

Quite revolutionary was the presence of women for the first time in this huge gathering of churchmen. A limited number, representing religious Orders and women's lay organizations, were permitted to attend such meetings as were of particular interest to women; in addition, fifteen women auditors were appointed, eight nuns and seven "lay" — the former irreverently alluded to in a Catholic journal as "these holy battle-axes"!

All this, as already said, is more or less domestic matter for Mother Church. Not so the statement on deicide which professes to absolve the Jewish people as a whole from the guilt of "putting God to death." Here was something colourful, which reporters seized on eagerly and of which the orthodox Jewish Press has been bitterly critical, maintaining that such absolution was implied to be dependent upon conversion, the corollary clause being that "the Church expects with unshakable faith and with ardent desire the entrance of that people (i.e., the Jews) into the fullness of the people of God

established by Christ."

But of course the crux of the Council is its approach to Christian unity. For that end mainly was it called into being, though, inevitably, with such a hope in view, a re-examination and (where needful) an overhauling of the entire structure of the church, along with — possibly — some re-statement of its doctrines, was bound to follow also.

The Ecumenical Movement! These are sweet words in many ears today. And sweet is the vision they conjure up — a united Christendom — a brotherhood *in actu,* such as this poor world has never yet been blessed with the sight of, from the days of Peter and Paul downwards. A beguiling phrase has crept into currency — "our separated brethren." Gone are the days when "heresy was thought of as a spiritual leprosy, from which pastors had the imperative duty of protecting their flock" — pastors Catholic and Protestant alike, let us add in all fairness. Clergy and journalists have heaped praise on Pope Paul for his statement:

> If we (i.e., the Church of Rome) are in any way to blame for that separation we humbly beg God's forgiveness and ask pardon too of the brethren who feel themselves to have been injured by us.

"This," observes the Anglican Bishop of Ripon, "was a courageous thing to say. Let us thank God that it has been said."

All that has been quoted here has been gleaned from periodicals in Rome. And there is no intention deliberately to denigrate, still less to mock. Surely one must assume that men who claim to follow Christ are sincere in their professions, both to him and to each other. Moreover, the writer recalls some such men personally — Franciscan friars, Benedictine monks — recalls, too, the late Pope himself, who was truly John the beloved disciple — and has too much reverence for their dedicated lives to wish to "score points" in any cheap fashion.

But we are looking at the Council in the light of Theosophy. And we have to remember that the world has *always* had Theosophy, that true wisdom about God and the human soul which has been transmitted down the ages by a succession of great Teachers, so that the poor excuse of ignorance could never at any time be put forward on behalf of dogmatism and bigotry. All this that is being promulgated now as so new, so revolutionary, so progressive, has been common matter to Theosophists always, the very ground of their belief. When did they not know that Unity is the very essence and *sine qua non* of our life here on earth? Do not we state over and over that the primal object of the Theosophical Movement is "to form the nucleus of a Universal Brotherhood of Humanity, without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste, or colour"? Without distinction of sex! Vatican Council II is adjudged to have taken a unique step in allowing a limited number of women to attend certain of its meetings. Almost two thousand years have these Catholic women waited for such a privilege! When did Theosophy thus discriminate? When, in its eyes, were women presumed to be less spiritually capable than men? Theosophy as Theosophy pays no heed to sex. As W. Q. Judge points out, a certain soul "did very well" in the female body of H. P. Blavatsky.

It will be "progressive" for the Church of Rome to allow the laity a voice in its functioning. Has there ever, in our Movement, been an embargo of silence on those who lack some such specific qualification as "a course in divinity"? It will be "revolutionary" should priests ever marry and combine family life with service at the altar. Let us turn to the Laws of Manu and read there of the nobility of being "merely" a Householder.

As for freedom of conscience — ah, now we come back again to the supreme point of all, to the very core of this great gathering of churchmen. Christians are they one and all, vowed to love their neighbours as themselves,

spiritual descendants of the Apostle Paul, that true mystic, who declared that in Christ there is neither Jew (i.e. the privileged believer) nor Gentile, neither bond nor free. "He hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us." Yet it is this same body of churchmen which the world is watching so intently and is prepared to praise for emancipation from prejudice as they slowly and cautiously begin to approach their "separated brethren" who prefer to worship differently, and to show "a new respect," as one of their Catholic weeklies says, "for all honest men," not refraining though, from adding, "however great their errors."

For how long has Theosophy not shown such respect — such an old, *old* respect? "The true Theosophist belongs to no cult or sect, yet belongs to each and all." Let us remember that this is a *fact*. It is the state of affairs at this present moment; whereas union with the "separated brethren," however desirable, remains extremely dubious. One notes the wording of that statement of Pope Paul's which the Bishop of Ripon thanks God for. "We ask pardon from the brethren *who feel themselves* to have been injured by us." Is there no hint that the brethren may be wrong to feel any such thing? That is not a frank and open recantation after centuries of bigotry. Not, let it be repeated, that the bigotry was ever all on one side. But we are not dealing with the history of religious persecution. We are looking at the Vatican Council in the light of Theosophy.

Scanning the correspondence columns of Catholic journals, one realizes that Ecumenism has still a long way to go. "Mere chumminess," one letter points out, "is no substitute for theology." Says another, "Basic differences in the last resort are doctrinal," while a third suspects "a steady whittling down of doctrines" — i.e., for the shocking end of rendering them more generally acceptable! Even more unpromising is the broad hint in *The Tablet* that all these

> earnest and obviously deeply-felt protestations . . . towards the separated brethren are meant to lessen the shock when the shock comes, as come it must, with the revelation of what membership of the Church must mean in Catholic theology and how great is the difference between belonging and not belonging to it.

Cast the light of Theosophy on this! Can one stand in it and not feel deep sadness that the quirks and quibbles of theology should so pitifully distort the idea of unity? Ecumenism itself, the very movement that seeks unity, is divided! So far as Protestantism is concerned, its vehicle is the World Council of Churches, but hitherto the Church of Rome has permitted only "unofficial" contacts with this, though a few "official" Catholic observers have, more recently, been allowed to attend its conferences and "collaboration is now accepted in so far as it does not directly involve Catholic doctrine."

Verily, the attainment of unity among churchmen is not easy! There is so much intricate machinery to be studied before it can even be set working. Now that it is hoped to turn out a masterpiece in the form of One Universal Church, what deft hands are needed to guide the wheels within wheels, and what subtle interpretation is required of that portion of the instructions provided for the workmen which comprises

> two essential principles, one the duty of safeguarding Catholic dogma in its entirety, the other the duty of charity. The first must never be compromised in the supposed interests of the second.

Strange and sad, is it not, that the two great sections of Christian believers should still find it so difficult, and so dangerous to their "faith," to meet on common ground? Strange also, though not necessarily sad, that on a single point those two *would* unite — both would completely rule out Theosophy as a guiding-rule of life for the very reason that it sees no dogmatic barriers between one divine revelation and another!

It has been suggested that the Pope's

visit to India in December, for the purpose of attending the Eucharistic Conference in Bombay, may be seen as "a practical expression of that dialogue with non-Christian religions that he is concerned to foster." Good and well should it be so, but when the *rapprochement* within Christianity itself is so difficult one can hardly hope for a speedy understanding with the other great world faiths. At present it is Theosophists only who declare with Tennyson (in *Akbar's Dream*) that

> There is light in all,
> And light, with more or less of shade, in all
> Man-modes of worship,

and it is a vital part of our work to spread the knowledge of this *fact* — for fact it is, as can easily be proved by studying the sacred books of the various religions, every one of which agrees with every other in its basic teachings, just as every great Master, be he Krishna, Christ, the Buddha, or any other, has repeated the same eternal truths for his own particular period of the present *manvantara*.

It is because this limitless vision of unity is the great glory of Theosophy that one is continually saddened by organized Christianity, of which the Vatican Council is, as we have said, the latest and most spectacular instance at the moment. Is not there something pitiful in the sight of this vast, scholarly assembly with all its elaborate modes of procedure (e.g. the setting-up of a Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity) toiling and struggling to overcome the self-made barriers of theology which divide Catholic and Protestant? Is not there something pitiful in the acknowledgement of the impassability of these barriers throughout the centuries implicit in the Bishop of Ripon's "Thank God!" for that ambiguous admission of intolerance in Pope Paul's quoted statement? And if the Papacy has indeed reached the point of seeking pardon for former errors, how pitiful to think that all the persecutions (on both sides) in times past, the heresy-hunts and burnings at the stake, were so much tragic waste! What is (perhaps) slowly to be accepted as just and right now was equally just and right then, and was only denied by such bigotry as still, alas, rears its head in a recent reference to God's "divinely appointed mouthpiece, the Catholic Church."

With all desire not to be uncharitable, what a shocking phrase is this! Here, by the light of Theosophy, do we see dogmatic presumption in unashamed nakedness. A "divinely appointed mouthpiece"! Then, presumably, it spoke aright even through the Spanish Inquisitors! So one may be forgiven for asking, Do the Catholics who are now "seeking pardon" lay the responsibility for such misdeeds on God himself? This thought may possibly have occurred to the Archbishop of Strasbourg when, at a recent sitting of the Council, he asked the Roman Catholic Church to confess publicly "its miserable and unjust condemnation of Galileo" (for his assertion that the earth moved round the sun).

But again, our purpose is not simply to write unkindly and point out the errors of churchmen. Christianity does not bear the sole guilt of bigotry, after all, though undoubtedly its record of ill-doing in the name of religion is among the worst. If we are looking at the Vatican Council in the light of Theosophy, it is not because we seize the opportunity of using it as a target, but because it is the supreme example at this moment of organized religion in action and a fresh revelation to us of the difference between the eternal universal principles, which unite, and the tenets of theology, which divide.

All the great faiths embody the universal principles. But in the Wisdom-Religion we have them *par excellence*. They are (a) acknowledgement of that unity which prevails throughout the cosmos; (b) compassion for all that lives; (c) recognition of the law of spiritual evolution through the workings of Karma and rebirth. Any one of these, and especially the last, should be enough

to save us from the sin of trying to impose our own view of Truth *by force* on another. But at the same time they make it incumbent on us to try to spread that Truth as we know it, not with the backing of our own poor authority but with that of every God-sent Teacher who has come into the world. To this end we must study the sacred books handed down to us, all so alike in their message, admitting no superiority in one more than in another, no "divinely-appointed mouthpiece" within any single system. And as we accord liberty to others to follow their own spiritual path, whether it lead them by church, chapel, or Himalayan hermit-cell, so must we claim it, quietly and steadfastly, for ourselves as Theosophists, not beguiled by any "brotherly" demands or pleadings from any quarter — no, not even from our dearest — into playing false with our deepest beliefs.

Theosophy must never die out! That, of course, in one sense, would be impossible; for, in its content, it is part of that Reality, that archetypal Ideation, behind all phenomena. But it could be lost sight of temporarily, if it were not safeguarded and passed on, as it has been to ourselves. We could not have had it otherwise, nor can those who will come after us. And Theosophy — undogmatic "wisdom about God" — is essential to man's spiritual freedom.

Let us make it plain that in saying this we are not belittling any branch of organized religion *as such*. We are not to be numbered with theists and agnostics, though even these seem to be swamped by the materialists nowadays. But a branch is but a branch; it can never be the whole tree or bear the entire crop of fruit. And we must for ever deny the claim of any one religious system that it has a monopoly of the truth. We see unity in all and seek to further it, but are opposed to bigotry wherever it is found.

So thinking, so striving, perhaps we may have learnt something and done no ill to any by looking at this latest great Council of the Roman Catholic Church in the light of Theosophy.

JOAN N. BURNETT

LEAVES FROM A PARIS DIARY

[OUR old friend, **Shri Baldoon Dhingra,** spent some of the summer months in revisiting India. He speaks bluntly and sincerely of what he saw and felt.—ED.]

WHAT worried me most, while in India these summer months, was an increasing lack of resistance to things and a general complaisance. He who never says "No," someone has said, is no true man, but worthy of an anthill, wherein God has ceased to have a place. . . . Yet man is great in his faith, not in the arrogance of his revolt. . . .

Amongst the educated and the "new generation" there seemed to be faith in no great thing; and diminishing challenges. One could say that lack of nourishment has deprived millions of the power to speak or to think. But I speak of those whose bellies were full and who could waste food unthinkingly; which is worse. I would rather be the lean coolie in the mountains of Almora than those fat hucksters I saw by the dozen in Chandni Chowk or Connaught Circus squatting snug on their money bags.

But the fate of many young men is sad. It is not for their want of intelligence that I feel grieved: it is because there is drift around them and no sense of direction. A fat lot of good Western education has done them if they have become passive and paralytic! Yes, "Westernism" has not yet caught on amongst those who rule the country.

There is, to all intents and purposes, no growing synthesis. How can there be? We have forgotten or know ill the forces of the Indian heritage and have incorporated the long-discarded superficialities of the Occident, lock, stock, and barrel. The result is a far greater arrogance and servility than at any other time in recent years. This sort of behaviour is evident both at home and abroad. Visitors to the country notice this all the time unless other considerations — such as "guru-hunting," a new pastime — come to the fore.

When I speak of "guru-hunting" I include all people, Easterners and Westerners, in this category. To a great number this provides a fresh escape, an outlet for a desire to shirk responsibilities. There are, of course, exceptions: people who come back, as the Venezuelan Antonio has recently done, invigorated to take up day-to-day problems. But I speak of the self-centred ones who, having found their "treasure," think but to possess it. "I have my passport to the firmament. You can mind your own business, for this is mine," they say. But that was never the Way. You have to grow greater in loving-kindness towards your fellow men. That is what I feel is so sadly lacking in the New India. I spoke about this inertia and indifference to my dear friend S.W. and Bindu Joshi. Tagore was right when he once said, referring to the dissipation of energy whenever it is used, that since we can merely indulge in gestures of wrath, our mounting frenzy, with our purpose lost, throws our energy into reckless waste. The root of the trouble lies in this, that our notion of "unity" remains in heaven but does not come down to earth.

I think we have ceased to be, in greater part, a pagan people, seeking a oneness with man and beast. That notion gone, we drift like wafers on the waters and lose the inner calm which characterizes the sages of India. I speak of those who seem to be seemingly asleep but are very much alive: the kind of activity that can and does manifest itself in silence.

Now when I returned to Paris I found a good example of this silent communication explained in Graf von Durckheim's book, *Hara*, just published in French. Now, this book has fascinated me before, but upon re-reading it in French, in which it reads so well, I was struck at once by the author's lucidity and the fascinating subject treated. Talking of *Hara* in everyday life in Japan, the Professor says:

> Man in his self-assurance holds too strongly to what he believes is his by his own efforts. Not only does he not hesitate to attract attention to himself but he even emphasizes his *persona*. . . . Now this is far from intended by Japanese in their inward search, for to them life has meaning only if a man does not fall out of the cosmic order and if he maintains his contact with the great original Unity.

This unshakable sense of gravity, this *Hara*, is what is needed to harmonize the outer and inner man.

> The Buddhas are symbols of that state of soul which man is called upon to manifest in his body where origin, meaning and goal of life have become one. . . . Hara implies the *whole man* in full contact with the nourishing, begetting, conceiving, carrying and re-generating root forces of life.

Durckheim does in fact imply that the middle way — which is the belly — creates the balance. He says the synthesis, say between East and West, between head and heart, in a manner of speaking, exists in the centre of the whole person. "What belongs to the head or the heart alone is really peripheral and therefore remote from Being."

Perhaps, of all Asian people, the Japanese have arrived at a synthesis, a balance between contemplation and action. And the Buddha's way, so long lost to us and yet part of our heritage, may provide the answer. In this context as well as because it is is a book of profound clarity and depth I highly rec-

ommend the perusal of Durckheim's *Hara*.*

What is needed in India today is something to combat apathy, indifference on the one hand and extreme emotionalism on the other. A rediscovery or understanding of the spirit of the Buddha will show our great need today: to realize that human welfare is the one object towards which our enthusiasm is to be directed. As I understand it, *Hara* also means creating a balance in human relationships, between the rich and the poor, between the restraining hands of the conservatives and the openmindedness, even enthusiasm, of the reformer. *Hara* means harmony, and our best endeavours throughout our history have been those where harmony between the component differences, attitudes, forms, has been effected. Hindu society, as I see it, needs teachers, new teachers. The Bharat Sadhu Samaj has men like Swami Ananda. Can this new education be given to the young and can we try to bring about this harmony? Nothing much can be done if we do not instil into people's mind the idea that all work handsomely done is sacred, that our new generation can with the same equanimity clean utensils as dust typewriters, and that sitting at an office desk is not necessarily worthier than sweeping the floor. Unless we can create such an atmosphere, our students will not be ready to do all tasks, as they are in the West.

Did you ever see a high Hindu official (or even a middling one) carry his own brief-case to office while his peon walked behind, empty-handed? Or himself get up to fetch a glass of water for his guest in his own house?

In some Ashrams I have visited I have seen with my eyes a sense of helplessness when a servant leaves. The *sadhus*, many of them, have learned to sit still, but cannot cook or wash dishes. And these are, nevertheless, responsible for attempting to produce a new generation of stalwarts. I speak of those who are eager to promote notions of contemplation and activity. Happily there are, as I saw in Dehra Dun, some exceptions. Here the Guru himself shows that all work is equally sacrosanct.

BALDOON DHINGRA

* Reviewed in THE ARYAN PATH, September 1962 (p. 421), by R. H. Ward.—ED.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

In the last century the phrase "nature red in tooth and claw" caught the imagination of the Western world, as it seemed to explain and excuse human addiction to war and destruction. Today evidence shows overwhelmingly that it has no basis in fact. Two most illuminating talks on the B.B.C. Third Programme by W. M. S. Russell provide a comparison between monkeys and men in a study of violence (*The Listener*, 5 and 12 November 1964). Pioneer studies of monkey communities, made in zoos in the twenties, gave a picture of "anarchic mobs, kept in sporadic subjection by repressive police states, headed by dictators with exclusive harems." After the second world war this was contradicted, completely and unanimously by field observers studying monkeys in the wild state. Whatever part of the world was studied,

there was no fighting within and between bands, and it became evident that "violence is a property of societies exposed to stress," and to overcrowding, as in zoos. This applies not only to monkeys but to virtually all mammals.

In the wild two automatic control systems — "territory" and "hierarchy" — avert fighting. Each animal has its own territory, in which it is dominant. On common ground "rank" takes precedence. This may be based on individual development or on priority in time. Monkey bands live close together, but share certain common territory. Within each band there is a relative hierarchy "mitigated in practice by considerable social mobility." Changing of leaders is by "bloodless *coup d'etat*," and their position is earned by their experience in finding food, avoiding danger for the band, defending personally any of them from predators, and, helped by those next in rank, putting a stop to any threatened quarrels within the community.

Baby rhesus monkeys brought up together learn their relative capacities and establish friendships, by friendly playing, wrestling, and romping. When any fighting capacities develop later, the already established patterns of hierarchy, plus the bonds of affection, keep them under control. It is disastrous to isolate them with their mothers. They fail to develop the friendships and the harmony of the hierarchy, become aggressive and "delinquent," while the mothers suffer stress effects also. When monkey societies are forced into overcrowded conditions, as in a zoo, without scope for "the versatile skills, the exploratory know-how and the individualistic enterprise of their wild life," there is no real leadership linked to responsibility and experience. The community is affluent as regards food and shelter, but all the natural regulating mechanisms for the group's well-being break down. Flight is impossible, leadership is replaced by tyranny, and toadying takes the place of affection.

Naturalists' researches have shown three main mechanisms for solving momentary mental conflict: (1) a cut-off, ignoring the source of conflict; (2) redirection of frustrated feelings by an attack on a more vulnerable animal; (3) a temporary easing of tension by displacement activities, generally termed pseudo-sexual, or by ritualizing of aggression. In zoos these mechanisms become prominent, as symptoms of an endemic violence. Similar parallels can be seen in affluent overcrowded human societies.

Though monkey bands diverge from their neighbours in behaviour, customs, and "code of social automatic signals," since they do not have to mix with each other, this does not matter. It is otherwise with human societies whose groups and cultures interpenetrate, through trade and other international relations. There is inevitable stress from this intermingling, but we can call rational language to our aid. Our language at present is mainly for technical exchange, we do not yet apply it "fully to the understanding and satisfaction of human needs"; but we should eventually be able to do so. "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent." We must learn, Mr. Russell rightly says, to communicate by talking. Our future does not lie in becoming animals, but in becoming really human beings.

Sir Leon Bagrit, chairman of Elliott Automations, gave the 1964 B.B.C Reith Lectures during November on the subject of "The Age of Automation." He presented a mass of fascinating detail about the working and the amazing accomplishments and speed of the electronic computer, "the heart of most systems of automation." Two fundamental points that he stressed were, first, that "automated machines are only an extension of man's own capacities and not a substitute for man himself" (*The Listener*, 19 November 1964); and, secondly, that we need to make a "determined effort to produce better-balanced people" (*Ibid.*, 26

November 1964).

Because of the staggering capacities and possibilities of computers, and because of confusion of thought in using terms like "thinking" and "deciding" in connection with them, even trained scientists have tended to identify the computor's activity too closely with that of human beings. But, as Sir Leon points out, man-designed and man-made machines can do certain things better than man himself, at incredible speed. They can improve their performance by examination, they can "accumulate information and sort out their own reasons for success and failure." When controlled and "programmed" by intelligent human beings they do intelligent work, even writing their own programmes. But they can do nothing at all without "the initial human master programmer."

> . . . to compare such machines to human beings is to endow them with intuitive qualities and with values and with subconscious sources of information, and these specifically human attributes they simply do not possess.

Therefore the human being in the age of automation, especially the administrator, should not be a specialist, but should be broadly educated in the humanities and in the philosophy and history of science, and should have practical experience as participant in some project in countries other than his own, in order to have a more universal understanding of the world. Such education should not be directed just at a "governing class," but the potentialities of everyone should be considered.

Towards the end of October 1963 there were published in the scientific journal *Nature* the results of a survey of Stonehenge by electronic computor, which correlated sightings from various stones of the circles with the position of sun and moon on the horizon at rising and setting in the year 1500 B.C. Professor Gerald S. Hawkins, an American mathematician, has been able by means of this modern technique to show how complex a calendar Stonehenge is.

If modern scientists have had to wait for the electronic computor before they could understand thus far the working patterns and purpose of Stonehenge, the question inevitably comes up as to how the ancient builders, whatever their date, managed to construct the giant calendar in the first place.

About a year later, in *Science,* another American scientific writer, Alexander Marshack, has reported discoveries that show that long before men took to agriculture, the fishers and hunters of the last Ice Age (that ended roughly about 10,000 B.C.) had made lunar calendars. His discovery comes from extensive examination of the symbols — lines, dots, and such like — of Ice Age art, whether inscribed on bone and ivory or on rock walls.

It is certain that the dates of civilization and culture are continually being pushed back. It may even be that history will come eventually to accept the existence of the giants traditionally linked with the erection of such zodiacal and other colossal works in stone. Perhaps, too, the reality may be granted of the legendary divine kings who are reputed to have taught the early races the sciences and arts. Even if one cannot accept these as yet, it is obvious there are many more discoveries ahead to throw light on the greatness of the past.

For whether they looked upward they saw the Divine Vision
Or whether they looked downward still they saw the Divine Vision,
Surrounding them on all sides beyond sin and death and hell.

— WILLIAM BLAKE